Beyond the Shultz Initiative: The New Administration and the Palestinian Problem

Abstract

BEYOND THE SHULTZ INITIATIVE: THE NEW ADMINISTRATION AND THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM John P. Hannah and Martin Indyck JLi April 1988, in the midst of his third trip of the year to the Middle East trying to revive the Arab-Israeli peace process, Secretary of State George Shultz noted that the e/fect of the Palestinian uprising, or intifadah , in the West Bank and Gaza Strip was "in many respects to make my task harder."1 In his own understated way, the secretary was acknowledging a reality that most outside observers were also coming to recognize: rather than increasing the chances for a breakthrough on the peace process, violent clashes between Israelis and Palestinians had actually made a negotiated settlement of the conflict more difficult to achieve. Eight months and one trip later, there is little basis for taking issue with Shultz's pessimistic assessment. Indeed, in some ways, the situation has worsened. The uprising has settled into a state of chronic disorder, increasing the costs of the status quo to both Israel and the Palestinians, while reinforcing the hatred, fear, and suspicion that have made the conflict so intractable. Jordan's King Hussein—for twenty years, Israel and the United States' preferred partner for negotiations— has, for the moment, severed his kingdom's ties to the West Bank, thereby removing Jordan from the role of primary Arab interlocutor in the peace process. 1. John M. Goshko, "Shultz Seems Resigned that Mideast Peace will Elude Him," The Washington Post, April 10, 1988, A22. John P. Hannah is a fellow at, and Martin Indyck is executive director of, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Respectively, they served as rapporteur and convener of the institute's Presidential Study Group on U.S. Policy in the Middle East. This article is based on the group's report, "Building for Peace: An American Strategy for the Middle East." 87 88 SAIS REVIEW Although the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) seems to be creeping toward a more pragmatic posture, all indications are that its actions will fall far short of the minimum steps necessary to demonstrate that it is committed to peace and therefore an acceptable partner for negotiations. The new U.S. president, then, is almost certain to enter office in 1989 with the peace process still stalled and Israelis and Palestinians locked in a protracted intercommunal battle. While the uprising, by itself, represents more of a chronic irritant to U.S. policy than an acute threat to American interests, it will have to be a source of concern for the new administration. The continued festering of the Palestinian problem heightens tensions in an already dangerous Middle East environment. In particular, several recent developments have increased the chances of a new Arab-Israeli war: Syria has accelerated its military buildup and continues to insist that the conflict with Israel can be resolved only by force; the proliferation of long-range ballistic missiles and chemical weapons and their use with great effectiveness in the war between Iraq and Iran have escalated the regional arms race to a new, more destabilizing level; and the end of the Iraq-Iran War leaves the Arab states of the Persian Gulf with huge military arsenals and the option of eventually refocusing their energies from the conflict with Iran to the conflict with Israel. It is this danger of eroding stability and war, to which the uprising contributes, that poses the real threat to U.S. interests in the Middle East. As part of a larger strategy to contain that threat, the new president will need to make the management and resolution of the Palestinian problem a priority on his foreign policy agenda. Along with deterring Syria, stabilizing the Arab-Israeli military balance, and promoting an accommodation between Israel and Arab states, the president must seek to promote a process that encourages reconciliation between Israelis and Palestinians. However, before leaping into the fray with a new Middle East peace initiative, the new administration must soberly assess how recent developments have affected the climate for resolving the conflict. In particular, it will need to understand why Secretary Shultz's determined effort during the first six months of 1988 failed to produce a...