Air Defense Identification Zone Research Articles

Hong Kong 2020: The downfall of «one country two systems»

The year 2020 started with President Tsai winning a second term and the DPP obtaining once again a parliamentary majority in the general elections held on 11 January. By the end of the year, Taiwan emerged as one of the few polities able to effectively put the COVID-19 pandemic under control. More impressively, it was able to do so without resorting to lockdown strategies, relying instead on timely decision-making and effective tracing, testing, and treating. Taiwan’s success, in turn, amplified the island’s relevance in Asia-Pacific international politics. Foreign support for expanding its access to international organizations, and especially the WHO in light of the pandemic, reached new heights, but it met Beijing’s vehement pushback. Chinese military pressure, a constant across the Strait since 2016, reached new heights, as the PLA Air Force routinized operations within Taiwan’s Air Defence Identification Zone. The policies of the outgoing Trump administration, which accelerated the freefall of Sino-American relations and continued to dramatically expand the scope of Washington’s relations with Taiwan, further exacerbated cross-Strait relations. The worsening security environment, however, did not hinder a Tsai administration buoyed by the successful management of the pandemic, economic growth, and widespread refusal of China’s strategy for unification among the public. Conversely, the KMT, Taiwan’s major position party, after a brief flirt with populist politics with the failed presidential candidature of Han Kuo-yu, continued to struggle under the new leadership of Johnny Chiang. Post-electoral calls for reforming the party and move its China policy away from the 1992 Consensus did not produce any meaningful change.

DETERMINATION OF AIR DEFENSE IDENTIFICATION ZONE (ADIZ) IN ORDER TO SUPPORT SOVEREIGNTY OF NATIONAL AIR REGION

One aspect of air spatial arrangement relating to national airspace sovereignty is to establish Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) which established on the basis of security considerations, particularly for the purposes of foreign aircraft identification. ADIZ Indonesia that has been established at this time is not ideal because it is still above Java and surrounding areas, which is still not sufficient in the face of the vast territory of Indonesia. In order to do so, the purpose of this study is to analyze the current condition of ADIZ Indonesia, what efforts have been made to re-establish ADIZ Indonesia in order to suport sovereign national airspace, and the ADIZ stipulation provision in accordance with international air law. This research using qualitative method, data collected by interview and literature review. The results show that ADIZ Indonesia currently resides in the airspace of a small portion of South Sumatra, Java and Madura, Bali, Lombok and a small portion of the western Sumbawa Island, not outside the territorial sea territory (ZEE). Attempts to reassign ADIZ Indonesian terrritory has been implemented through discussion forums or FGDs held at BNPP, and the appointment of ADIZ Indonesia is already based on international customary law at that time. Keywords: ADIZ, aircraft identification, airspace sovereignty, air law raden 15.00 Normal 0 false false false IN X-NONE X-NONE /* Style Definitions */ table.MsoNormalTable {mso-style-name:Table Normal; mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0; mso-tstyle-colband-size:0; mso-style-noshow:yes; mso-style-priority:99; mso-style-parent:; mso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; mso-para-margin-top:0cm; mso-para-margin-right:0cm; mso-para-margin-bottom:8.0pt; mso-para-margin-left:0cm; line-height:107%; mso-pagination:widow-orphan; font-size:11.0pt; font-family:Calibri,sans-serif; mso-ascii-font-family:Calibri; mso-ascii-theme-font:minor-latin; mso-hansi-font-family:Calibri; mso-hansi-theme-font:minor-latin;} One aspect of air spatial arrangement relating to national airspace sovereignty is to establish Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) which established on the basis of security considerations, particularly for the purposes of foreign aircraft identification. ADIZ Indonesia that has been established at this time is not ideal because it is still above Java and surrounding areas, which is still not sufficient in the face of the vast territory of Indonesia. In order to do so, the purpose of this study is to analyze the current condition of ADIZ Indonesia, what efforts have been made to re-establish ADIZ Indonesia in order to suport sovereign national airspace, and the ADIZ stipulation provision in accordance with international air law. This research using qualitative method, data collected by interview and literature review. The results show that ADIZ Indonesia currently resides in the airspace of a small portion of South Sumatra, Java and Madura, Bali, Lombok and a small portion of the western Sumbawa Island, not outside the territorial sea territory (ZEE). Attempts to reassign ADIZ Indonesian terrritory has been implemented through discussion forums or FGDs held at BNPP, and the appointment of ADIZ Indonesia is already based on international customary law at that time. raden 15.00 Normal 0 false false false IN X-NONE X-NONE <w:Lsd

Proposing an Air Defense Identification Zone on the South China Sea for Vietnam and ASEAN countries

The unilateral establishment of the Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) on the East China Sea along with a variety of unilateral moves to confirm its illegitimate sovereignty on the South China. Indicating that China is preparing necessary conditions to establish an ADIZ on the South China Sea. As a country with interests associated with the South China Sea in the region, Vietnam should be proactive in all possible future situations. As a result, Vietnam should conduct research and prepare conditions to establish an ADIZ on the South China Sea so as to protect national sovereignty on the South China Sea prior to the unilateral imposition by China.

Kebijakan Luar Negeri Jepang terhadap Pemberlakuan Zona Identifikasi Pertahanan Udara Tiongkok

Sengketa Kepulauan Senkaku menjadi salah satu sengketa kedaulatan teritorial yang paling kontroversial di Asia. Jepang dan Tiongkok telah berselisih Kepulauan sejak 1970. Konflik tersebut semakin memanas pada tahun 2013 ketika Tiongkok mendirikan Zona Identifikasi Pertahanan Udara. Tiongkok dan Jepang akan menanggapi setiap tindakan yang dilakukan oleh kedua negara untuk membela legitimasi masing-maisng di Kepulauan Senkaku. Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk meneliti dan menganalisis respon yang diberikan oleh Jepang dalam menghadapi kebijakan Zona Identifikasi Pertahann Udara Tiongkok dan kebijakan yang akan dikeluarkan Jepang.

Inter-country relationship and mass media

Abstract This study aims to research mass media communication and multipolar relationships in public diplomacy by using announcement of China Air Defense Identification Zone (CADIZ) in November 2013 as a case. Based on importance of mass mediated public diplomacy, to examine wording and message structure, language analysis program of semantic and ego network is applied. In addition, considering the environment of Korean media, newspapers from democratic and conservative are selected. The CADIZ issue takes place in Northeast Asian region but reactions and the relations of the USA are mainly dealt with. The USA is closely connected to China and Korea and has an important influence as a consultant in the given situation. Moreover, Korean media keep monitoring Japan’s response to refer Korea’s response strategy. Semantic and ego network seem to be powerful when analyzing international conflicts. This research shows that international relationship can be a significant asset to public diplomacy. In short, analyzing multipolar relations seems essential to understand construction of related countries and seek to solve diplomatic conflicts.

Steering between Primacies: Challenges to the Australia-U.S. Alliance

Steering between Primacies:Challenges to the Australia-U.S. Alliance Michael Wesley (bio) The Australia-U.S. alliance has experienced three straight decades of tightening and deepening, driven by a range of factors. The advent of the "unipolar moment" provided a strong incentive for Australia to make a sustained diplomatic effort to reinforce and renovate its alliance with the United States after the Cold War, rather than to attenuate it as Thailand and the Philippines did. The tech-driven surge in the U.S. economy, coupled with the revolution in military affairs, convinced successive Australian governments that the United States was an indispensable security partner for the foreseeable future. Regional and global security dynamics further drove a convergence in strategic interests. Post-Tiananmen China had stabilized Communist rule and inaugurated a sustained period of economic growth through the 1990s. Its insistence on the retrocession of Hong Kong and Macao and its "missile diplomacy" against Taiwan in 1996 underlined for many the arrival of a wealthy and assertive power in Asia. And by the end of the 1990s, the region's strategy of socializing China through regional organizations had clearly not worked. The September 11 attacks, followed by the Bali bombings on Australia's doorstep, focused Australian and U.S. concerns on terrorism and weak states for the decade that followed. Australia's strong support for U.S.-led campaigns in Central Asia and the Middle East, and its willingness to contribute to the controversial invasion of Iraq, provided ample opportunities to co-embed Australian and U.S. forces, integrate intelligence cooperation to unprecedented levels, and press forward with a range of interoperability initiatives. The alliance gained an economic pillar with the signing of a free trade agreement in 2005. The following discussion examines the challenges to the Australia-U.S. alliance that have emerged over the last decade. The essay then assesses Australia's strategic options and concludes by arguing that the allies need to develop a common strategy to balance China's rise. [End Page 59] Challenges for the Australia-U.S. Alliance Over the past decade, several trends have emerged to complicate the seemingly inexorable push by Australia to build ever-closer strategic ties with the United States. The first decade of the 21st century saw the remarkable complementarity between the Australian and Chinese economies become manifest. China became a massive importer of Australia's primary commodities, driving a trade boom that was unprecedented in Australian history, while China's own surge of manufacturing exports did not threaten Australia's small industrial sector. While Americans came to see China as an economic threat, Australians were seeing it as an economic opportunity. Toward the end of the decade, the global financial crisis opened up a real gap between the United States' and China's economic performance, as the latter country's strong economic growth placed it even more firmly at the center of regional trade dynamics. China's arms spending continued to spiral upward as the United States slashed its own military budget, a contrast that undermined the credibility of the commitment to "rebalance" U.S. forces to the Asia-Pacific, which President Barack Obama unveiled in a speech to the Australian Parliament in 2011. Rather than being cowed, China answered the rebalance with a more assertive challenge to U.S. primacy in the Pacific. In the South China Sea, it began to back its territorial claims more aggressively and declared an air defense identification zone over the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. Beijing began building and weaponizing artificial islands in the Spratly Islands, while also doubling down on its investments in anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) weapon systems, aimed at raising the risk to U.S. naval operations in the western Pacific. In both arenas, China challenged U.S. primacy materially, as well as testing the credibility of U.S. alliance commitments to the Philippines and Japan. To most observers in Australia, the United States' alliance credibility was enhanced through its strong support for Japan but damaged in relation to the Philippines. Meanwhile, China's assertiveness brought none of the diplomatic costs that analysts had expected. Trade, investment, and positive diplomatic ties continued with even those countries in...

Dredge Your Way to China?

This article examines five of the most important legal issues arising from Chinese reclamation and construction in disputed areas of the South China Sea. First, does the construction have any impact on competing territorial claims in the South China Sea? Second, does the construction affect rights to maritime zones? This involves consideration of the differing legal significance of islands, rocks, low tide elevations and artificial islands, the relevance of land reclamation and construction in this context, and the resulting implications for maritime zones including territorial seas, eezs and safety zones. Third, are there other legal consequences arising from the Chinese activity (for example, on environmental grounds)? Fourth, does the construction bolster any potential ability of China to impose an Air Defence Identification Zone in the South China Sea? Fifth, what is the significance – legally and practically – of the award in the South China Sea Arbitration?

The Effect of People's Republic of China (PRC) Territorial Claim on South China Sea (SCS) to Indonesia (2014 - 2016)

Currently, China has not abandoned its policy of resolving the contentious South China Sea (SCS) issue through peaceful means. China’s recent state behavior and unilateral military measures like naval blockades, and xenophobic rhetoric have all given the impression that overconfident China is increasingly shedding its soft-power image in resolving both the East China Sea and South China Sea disputes. China as the world’s 2nd largest economy which has already aroused deep suspicions among its neighbors by increasing its national defense budget in 2014 by 12 percent to USD132 billion, making it second in the world only to the U.S’s defense spending of USD528 billion. China’s recent measures such as new fisheries laws, the establishment of an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea and, most recently, a naval blockade around Second Thomas Shoal, known in China as the Ren’ai Reef and in the Philippines as Ayungin which is in the SCS have aggravated regional fears. In the past, China has resorted to military options to occupy territories that were claimed by other countries. In mid March 1988, China deployed its troops to seize the reefs of Co Lin (Collins), Len Dao (Lansdowne) and Gac Ma (Johnson South) in the Spratly archipelago, also known as Truong Sa in Vietnamese from Vietnam. China refers to Johnson South Reef as Chiguajiao, which is now under Beijing control. It raised question why China now resort to military options again in pursuing its South China Sea unilateral claim. None of Asian countries wants a war but China’s recent words and deeds are not only alarming but are moving in that direction. However, the main problem with China is that claims almost all of the SCS as its own, based on a vague Ushaped line known as the nine-dash line, an assertion that is fiercely contested by Vietnam, the Philippines, Taiwan, Malaysia and Brunei. Indonesia, which is not a claimant state, is more worried about China’s unilateral claims and its assertiveness, which could threaten regional peace and stability as well as the unity of ASEAN. China has now included part of Natuna Islands waters within Indonesia’s Riau Islands province in its territorial map based on the nine-dash line. It is a serious external threat to Indonesia’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. This research attempts to explain China’s territorial claim on Indonesia territory which interpreted differently by decision-makers. It used descriptive analytical methodology. It needs appropriate mechanism to prevent open conflict and promote cooperation among disagreeing parties.

Domestic Motivation and the Case of the East China Sea ADIZ: Diversion or Mobilization?

The Sino-Japanese dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands has intensified since 2012. In November 2013, China's Ministry of Defense declared an air defense identification zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea (ECS). An ADIZ refers to publicly defined area extending beyond national territory in which unidentified aircraft are liable to be interrogated and, if necessary, intercepted for identification before they cross into sovereign airspace (Welch 2013). While many states have set up their own ADIZs since 1948, the ECS ADIZ was considered a destabilizing move by East Asian states as well as other stakeholders because it includes the disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands and it applies generally to aircraft flying in the ECS ADIZ, regardless of whether the aircraft intends to enter the PRC's airspace (Rinehart and Bart 2015, 7). Since its announcement, many have sought to understand the motivation behind the ECS ADIZ. Some analysts have looked at it from a strategic perspective, while others have seen it as a result of Tokyo's provocative decision to nationalize the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in 2012 in the context of the hawkish foreign policy orientation of the Chinese president, Xi Jinping. However, all of these explanations overlook the possibility that domestic factors also played an important role in deciding to implement an ADIZ. Noting this shortcoming, some contributors to a special issue of Asian Perspective on the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands conflict presented analyses that took domestic factors into account. For instance, Togo (2014) and Hirano (2014) discussed how Japan's domestic have become entangled with international factors and how this has contributed to the dispute. Moore (2014, 238) looked at the role of politics at the domestic and international levels in China and Japan. Moore's argument is especially illuminating in that he establishes a two-level analytic framework to examine the interaction of ideational factors at different levels, in and across countries. In his conclusion, he suggests a face-to-face solution for the dispute, which would allow both sides [to] come away with enough face to proclaim victory to their constituents (238).However, although ideational factors are powerful in explaining the structure of conflict, they are insufficient to explain its timing. In this article, we argue that the issue cannot be fully understood without looking into the decisionmakers' political motivation. To offer another plausible explanation that may fill this gap, we consider two distinct theoretical frameworks: the diversionary foreign policy and the mobilization models. The first model is based on the idea that state leaders utilize external conflict to divert domestic attention away from their political, economic, or social problems in order to reconsolidate their power position. The second model deals with how state leaders manipulate international crises to mobilize patriotic sentiment among their citizens, making these citizens more willing to accept a radical policy agenda requiring the sacrifice of their individual rights. Both models focus on the linkage between domestic and foreign policy, but each has different theoret- ical and empirical implications. We assess which mechanism offers a better explanation of China's ADIZ decision by carefully reviewing available empirical evidence.Diversionary Incentive vs. Mobilization Effort: A Brief Theoretical ReviewScholars of Chinese foreign policy have made considerable efforts to understand the impact of domestic factors on China's decisions to take belligerent action. For example, Chen (1987) and Zhang (2010) argue that an important driver behind China's decision to fight a brief war with Vietnam in 1979 was Deng Xiaoping's domestic power struggle and his agenda of economic reform. In a broader examination of China's use of military force, Scobell (2003) also demonstrates that China's strategic culture, including the historical legacy of the cult of defense, the evolving civilmilitary culture, and military organizational culture, can be used to explain continuity and change in China's decisions to use military force abroad. …

Xi Jinping's Foreign Policy Dilemma: One Belt, One Road or the South China Sea?

Since Xi Jinping became President, General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and head of the Central Military Commission in 2012-13, a significant amount of attention has been devoted to his leadership style and foreign policy initiatives. (1) Under his leadership, several significant foreign policy initiatives have been undertaken, including a more stringent policy towards North Korea and the establishment of an Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the East Sea. Moreover, during the US-China presidential summit in June 2013, Xi called for a new type of major-power relationship, in which and the United States would strive to avoid conflict, increase cooperation and develop a mutually advantageous relationship. (2) Arguably, since Xi's ascent to power, China's foreign policy has moved decisively away from the two-decade old taoguang yanghui (keeping a low profile) to fenfa youwei (striving for achievement). (3) With regard to Southeast Asia, and in particular the South Sea dispute, Xi has made some bold policy decisions. For example, in May 2014 deployed the HYSY-981 drilling platform into Vietnam's claimed exclusive economic zone (EEZ) triggering a major crisis in Sino-Vietnamese relations. More significantly, from late 2013, began transforming seven atolls under its control in the Spratly Islands into massive artificial islands, leading to accusations that Beijing was militarizing the dispute. (4) And in January 2013, refused to participate in a legal case brought against it by the Philippines under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) which challenged Beijing's maritime jurisdictional claims in the South Sea, and subsequently rejected the final verdict when it was announced in July 2016. (5) At the same time as has been pursuing a more assertive policy in the South Sea, Xi has also telegraphed clear signals of goodwill and cooperation towards the countries of Southeast Asia. Perhaps the most important of these is Xi's proposed Economic Belt and the Twenty-first Century Maritime Silk Road announced in October 2013--together known as the Belt, One Road (OBOR) initiative--which aims to promote joint development, common prosperity and cooperation between and many countries across Asia. OBOR aims to reorient China's domestic economic structure by enhancing connectivity and cooperation between and the rest of Eurasia. OBOR is also a useful tool for to shape international rules and norms, as well as influence the global economic order, all of which are crucial to achieving President Xi's domestic China dream and international national rejuvenation. (6) But are Xi's assertive policies in the South Sea and OBOR contradictory? It is extremely difficult for Xi to promote cooperation via the OBOR while simultaneously pursuing an assertive posture in the South Sea. China's territorial and jurisdictional claims in the South Sea are highly contentious, and over the past decade have led to rising tensions between Beijing and the Southeast Asian claimants (Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei and even Indonesia), as well as between and other stakeholders such as the United States and Japan. Some scholars have even warned of the dangers of war in the South Sea. (7) Such a war, especially between and the United States, would be devastating for the entire region. It would also spell the end of China's grand cooperative initiative, the OBOR. Within China, opinions vary as to what the country's priorities should be. Some scholars tend to place less value on the OBOR and believe that upholding China's claims in the South Sea should take priority. (8) Other experts in believe that OBOR is more important than the South Sea, and that pursuing a hardline policy towards the dispute will undermine the initiative. …

(The Controversy of the Establishing Air Defense Identification Zone in the South China Sea under International Law)

Chinese Abstract: 2013年中國宣布在東海劃設防空識別區引發美國、日本及韓國等國關切及抗議後，在國際仲裁法院即將對菲律賓所提的南海爭端提出仲裁報告之際，近來又傳出中國可能另在南海劃設防空識別區 。然而，防空識別區之設立除了因欠缺國際法上依據而有適法性之問題外，因中國在防空識別區範圍內除了監控區域內航空器之活動外，更進一步禁止他國航空器於該區域內進行情報偵蒐及軍事訓練，此也引發中國是否侵犯他國航空器於聯合國海洋法公約下所享有之公海飛躍自由之問題。為了探討中國未來於南海設立防空識別區所可能涉及之國際法問題，本文之第一部分，將研析設立防空識別區在國際法上之依據及適法性問題，第二部份則藉分析中國於東海劃設防空識別區後所引發之問題，而探討中國擬劃設南海防空識別區對區域之影響及可能引發之爭議。English Abstract: Air Defense Identification Zone was created in the 1950s for states to extend its control beyond its territorial airspace to prevent long range attack from other countries. Nowadays, more than 20 countries have established ADIZs above the high sea or EEZ area. In four parts, this paper addresses the legal controversy that may arise if China establishes Air Defense Identification Zone in the South China Sea. The first part of this paper reviews the discussion about the legality of ADIZ under the international law. Second, from China’s ADIZ practices in the East China Sea, this paper observes how China’s ADIZ policies differ from the practices of other States and shall identify the unique problems that may arise from China’s establishment of ADIZ. Third, this paper observes the potential conflicts and controversies that may arise if China establishes ADIZ in the South China Sea. The discussed questions include if China’s ADIZ rules excessively obstructed the freedom of overflight and the rules under Chicago Convention, and how China’s ADIZ may correspond with its nine-dash line claims. This paper will also look into how the decision of the 2016 South China Sea Arbitration between Philippine and China may affect the legitimacy of China’s ADIZ in the South China Sea. The last part concludes.

Study on the Impact on Ieodo Overlapping Air Defense Identification Zone above the Maritime Jurisdiction and ROK Air Force`s Response Strategy

Study on the Impact on Ieodo Overlapping Air Defense Identification Zone above the Maritime Jurisdiction and ROK Air Force`s Response Strategy

China, the US, and the Law of the Sea

The South China Sea, a major transit area of international maritime traffic, is the scene of territorial and maritime claims expressed by the riparian states, including China but also Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, and Taiwan, and now represents one of the main stumbling blocks in the US-China bilateral relationship. Between October 2015 and mid-May 2016, a series of initiatives taken unilaterally by China on one side and the US on the other have greatly exacerbated the latent confrontation of the two powers in this maritime space.Chinese initiatives have essentially consisted of fitting out the Paracel Islands and some recently reclaimed reefs of the Spratly archipelago with transport infrastructure. To this end, the Chinese Ministry of Transport has installed three lighthouses on the Spratly Islands: two on Cuarteron and South Johnson reefs on 9 October 2015(1)and a third on Subi Reef on 6 April 2016.(2)On 2 January 2016, the spokeswoman for the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Hua Chunying, confirmed completion of construction of an aerodrome on Fiery Cross Reef, which US satellite photos already showed in 2014.(3) This confirmation was followed on 6 January by the organisation of two civilian flight tests - one operated by China Southern Airlines and the other by Hainan Airlines - between the airport of Haikou, the provincial capital of Hainan, and the new Fiery Cross airfield.(4) Both tests may indicate future exploitation of this line on the heels of what the Chinese authorities already planned to do in the Paracel Islands.(5) Finally, other actions such as the deployment of aircraft missile launchers on Woody Island on February 2016 (6) and anti-ship missiles in March(7) seem to confirm the militarisation of the Paracels while leaving some doubt as to the establishment of a similar process in the Spratlys, which could lead, according to some observers, to the delimitation of an air defence identification zone in the South China Sea. (8)These initiatives, which will probably be followed by others in the coming weeks and months, are the undisputed testimony of an increasingly firm will from China to increase its presence in the South China Sea in order to more effectively monitor this space and impose itself as the dominant power. China thus materialises a historically self-proclaimed sovereignty.At the same time, Washington has allowed the US Navy to conduct three Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOP). Three guided missile destroyers, the USS Lassen, on 27 October 2015, the USS Curtis Wilbur, on 30 January 2016, and the USS William P. Lawrence, on 10 May 2016, have respectively sailed within 12 nautical miles of Subi Reef, Triton Island, and Fiery Cross Reef, all claimed and occupied by China. (9)The fact that the two countries answer each other through these actions is obvious. The deployment of missile launchers on Woody Island is clearly a response to the passage of the USS Curtis Wilbur near Triton Island, all the more so given that China undertook this deployment during the US-ASEAN special leaders' summit in Sunnylands, California, in the course of which Barack Obama reiterated that the US would continue to fly, sail and operate wherever international law allows. The summit's joint statement, without clearly mentioning Chinese initiatives in the South China Sea, included calls for respecting freedom of and overflight in the maritime areas as well as non-militarization and self-restraint in the conduct of activities.(10)In fact, a major concern in Washington is that this assertion of Chinese presence in the South China Sea will eventually threaten freedom of navigation and in the process, American strategic and economic interests. This concern is partly fuelled by China's official position regarding certain articles and clauses of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) relating to the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea or in the conduct of activities by foreign military ships and aircraft in the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of the coastal state. …

Japan’s Perceptions of and Interests in the South China Sea

China's assertive and high-handed activities in Asian waters-especially in the East and South China Seas-are generating serious security concerns within the international community. In particular, China's unique, unilateral positions on maritime issues, which it claims are supported by its wider, and sometimes self-centered, interpretation of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and other established international rules, have puzzled regional states and stakeholders such as the United States. At the same time, disputes in the South China Sea risk escalating into military clashes between the United States and China.Thus, for Japan, the South China Sea does not simply involve territorial disputes among coastal nations but rather raises a grand issue that could cause a direct military collision, undermining existing stability and potentially leading the region and the world into an unprecedented chaotic situation. This essay examines Japan's perceptions of and interests in the South China Sea. Japan's primary concerns in the region are twofold: First, China's reclamation activities and military buildup could eventually give it strategic control of the sea lines of communication. Second, the potential escalation of tensions between China and the United States, Japan's key ally, poses a threat to regional stability. The essay then examines Japanese security policy and assesses what actions Japan could take to help stabilize the situation.An Overview of Japan's Key ConcernsChina's reclamation and island-building activities. Stretching approximately 1,750 miles from the Bashi Channel/Luzon Strait to Singapore and 1,250 miles from Hong Kong to Brunei, the South China Sea is roughly 9.5 times as large as Japan and includes around two hundred islands, rocks, shoals, and reefs. There are several prominent archipelagos, such as the Paracel Islands and the Spratly Islands, and each has its own strategic significance.Since 2013, China has started reclamation at seven lagoons and engaged in the construction of artificial islands. Fiery Cross Reef seems to be a core spot that includes full military facilities, most notably a runway and a deep port. Subi and Mischief Reefs, which are about 125 miles apart, are the other artificial islands with runways and port facilities. Japan fears that four other artificial islands with various support facilities could function as outer guard posts for the three main islands with airfields and air-surveillance sites that could enable a potential Chinese air defense identification zone in the South China Sea. These man-made islands, when fully completed, would provide China with strong footholds in the Spratly Islands for controlling most of the sea lines of communication and for monitoring foreign naval and air activities. Moreover, if China in the future ever successfully builds an artificial island at the Scarborough Shoal, there would be a strategic triangle connecting Woody Island, the Spratlys, and Scarborough Shoal that would cover most of the South China Sea. The impact of this strategic triangle would be tremendous for the United States' and Japan's strategic planning and could be a game changer in regional power relations.As a major global power, China has a national objective to be a nuclear power comparable with the United States. However, China lacks longrange bombers and, as a result, naturally depends on its strategic missile forces, including its maritime strategic nuclear capabilities, as a major element. In this context, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) Navy must maintain a robust nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) force and protect this force against the antisubmarine warfare capabilities of potential adversaries-especially the U.S. Navy's nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN) force. The PLA Navy has completed a new naval base at Sanya on Hainan Island, which is ideal for deploying its SSBN force to patrol in the Indian and the Pacific Oceans. …

A Critical Analysis of Media Reports on China's Air Defense Identification Zone

This study is based on the analysis and comparison of news articles about China's announcement of Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) through the three corpora built from English-language Chinese media, western media and Taiwanese media news reports. Applying this to the corpus linguistic technique of automated semantic tagging with a discourse-historical Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) framework, the article demonstrated how processes such as two-word concgrams, keywords, key semantic categories and relevant concordances analysis were able to identify representations of China's ADIZ as well as directing qualitative analysis. It further examined how ideology is reflected in this context via the media discourses in relation to China's ADIZ.

The East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone and International Law

Originating at the height of the Cold War, Air Defense Identification Zones (ADIZs), i.e. non-territorial airspace unilaterally designated by States for aircraft identification, had not encountered substantial protests until China's declaration of the East China Sea ADIZ in November 2013. Debates center not on the right to establish the ADIZ per se, but primarily on the purported application of identification rules to traversing aircraft, its overlap with pre-existing ADIZs claimed by other States, and the coverage of contested islands and rocks. This article argues that the identification of traversing civil aircraft does not jeopardize the paramount safety of international civil aviation, imposes only slight burden upon civil aircraft, and has garnered wide compliance. The identification of traversing military aircraft is a legitimate measure for coastal States to safeguard their security interest, and is constantly conducted by many States on a de facto basis. The overlap with ADIZs of other States and coverage of contested islands and rocks do not contradict international law and are legitimate measures for the maintenance of maritime and territorial interests. It is further suggested that all relevant States should negotiate mutually acceptable arrangements to avoid miscalculation and escalation, and to minimize confusions and inconveniences caused to third-party States.

Analyses and Implications of Policy Making Process Involved in Expanding Korea Air Defense Identification Zone (KADIZ) : In the perspective of Policy Stream Model by JW Kingdon

Analyses and Implications of Policy Making Process Involved in Expanding Korea Air Defense Identification Zone (KADIZ) : In the perspective of Policy Stream Model by JW Kingdon

Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law

• Progress Is Made Implementing U.S.-Russia Framework for Eliminating Syrian Chemical Weapons• United States Advocates for Syrian Peace Conference• United States Extends Deadline for Signing of Bilateral Security Agreement with Afghanistan• China Announces New Air Defense Identification Zone over East China Sea, PromptingU.S. Response• United States and Six Other States Reach Interim Agreement on Iranian Nuclear Program

Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law

• Progress Is Made Implementing U.S.-Russia Framework for Eliminating Syrian Chemical Weapons• United States Advocates for Syrian Peace Conference• United States Extends Deadline for Signing of Bilateral Security Agreement with Afghanistan• China Announces New Air Defense Identification Zone over East China Sea, PromptingU.S. Response• United States and Six Other States Reach Interim Agreement on Iranian Nuclear Program

China's Foreign Policy: Pursuing a More Active Foreign Policy while Upholding its National Interests

President Xi Jinping has been quick to make his mark on China's foreign policy compared to his predecessor, especially in fostering a positive momentum in China-US relations. China is also leveraging on its economic strength by engaging in mutually beneficial cooperation with other countries. Nevertheless, China's Air Defence Identification Zone and its expressed determination to administer the waters within the nine-dotted lines have cast doubts on China's professed policy of good neighbourly relations.