Agenda Control Research Articles

The origins of centralized agenda control at Westminster: Consensus or controversy?

AbstractCentralized agenda control is a feature of many parliaments, with important consequences for the conduct and outcomes of legislative politics. Much previous work has thus sought to understand the emergence of centralized agenda‐setting rules. We extend this literature by studying the “Balfour reforms”, which centralized agenda control in the early twentieth century UK House of Commons. Our aim is to probe a conventional claim in the existing literature: that the opposition supported these reforms. This is a counter‐intuitive claim, which rests on relatively little direct evidence. We analyze historical roll‐call data from 1902 to assess how far the opposition supported agenda centralization. We complement this analysis by examining attempted amendments and speech contributions to parliamentary debates. Contrary to the standard view, we find that the primary opposition party consistently resisted these reforms. This evidence of controversy rather than consensus revises our understanding of a key milestone in the development of the Westminster parliament, and contributes to the wider literature on the choice of agenda‐setting procedures.

Voting Rights, Agenda Control and Information Aggregation

Abstract This paper examines the comparative properties of voting rules based on the richness of their ballot spaces, assuming a given distribution of voting rights. We focus on how well voting rules aggregate the information dispersed among voters. We consider how different voting rules affect both voters’ decisions at the voting stage and the incentives of the agenda-setter, who decides whether to put the proposal to a vote. Without agenda-setter, the voting efficiency of rules is higher when their ballot space is richer. Moreover, full-information efficiency requires full divisibility of the votes. In the presence of an agenda-setter, we uncover a novel trade-off: in some cases, rules with high voting efficiency provide worse incentives to the agenda-setter to select good proposals. This negative effect can be large enough to wash out the higher voting efficiency of even the most efficient rules.

Strategic postponement of coalition policymaking in European Parliamentary democracies

AbstractCoalition policymaking concerns not only who decides what in which jurisdiction but also when, how speedy and in what rhythm. Due to the limited time budget and shadow of future elections, parties in charge of respective ministerial portfolios have to strategically organize their policy agendas to trade off between policy and electoral incentives in the face of coalition partners who monitor and control ministerial autonomy. However, despite the burgeoning literature on coalition governance, the temporal dimension of ministerial agenda control is less well understood. I advance this research by proposing a model to directly account for the influence of time budgets on timing decisions of ministers in policy initiation. In this model, I distinguish between different timing strategies of policy initiation a ministerial party may possibly adopt and identify in equilibrium a conditional postponing strategy by which ministers facing high scrutiny of coalition partners will postpone bill initiation till the end of the term. The empirical examination lends support to my argument and further demonstrates that the timing strategy of ministers can also be influenced by coalition conflict and policy saliency of bills.

Who controls the agenda? theological perspectives on state-controlled home education in the UK

ABSTRACT Questions regarding the dynamics of power and control involved in formulating the learning agenda for home-educating families arose due to the UK Government’s proposed Schools Bill in May 2022. Empirical research was prompted by concerns from Christian home educators about state interference in their child’s home education, due to perceptions that religious values were being undermined and the ultimate responsibility for raising their child was under dispute in the light of the proposed Bill. Theological underpinnings, Christian perspectives and consideration of holistic socio-cultural contexts were integral to explorations of control of the learning agenda through the lens of Christian home educators. The findings problematise external authorities dictating curriculum content, teaching methods or frameworks to families who have opted to educate their children outside of the mainstream school system, since such approaches are counter to the distinctive nature of a democratic society. Lived experiences of collaboration versus persuasion, and participants feeling mistrusted, devalued and side-lined have all led to a sense of suspicion and concern about authority. Greater dialogue is therefore recommended to enhance understanding and collaboration, mutual trust and cooperation across all parties.

Good Governance and the Partisan Wars: The Effects of Divided Government on Administrative Problem Solving and Oversight Agenda Setting in Congress

Abstract Congress’s constitutional responsibility to oversee and investigate the executive branch of government demands that instances of waste, fraud, and abuse in the administrative state be checked via both legislation and nonlegislative committee hearings. In this article, I establish an oversight agenda for Congress using the nonpartisan Government Accountability Office's (GAO) biennial identification of the most vulnerable federal agencies and programs. I then assess whether and how government-wide partisanship affects Congress’s ability to address this slate of issues. I find that, when government is divided, Congress is more legislatively productive on high-risk issues, and the House of Representatives is more likely to prioritize investigative hearings on high-risk issues. My results suggest a silver lining to the reality of partisan agenda control: preexisting administrative problems identified by well-positioned and well-informed observers at GAO may get more attention when there is a partisan incentive for the legislature to investigate an opposition-controlled government.

Fifteen years of research on payments for ecosystem services (PES): Piercing the bubble of success as defined by a Northern-driven agenda

Payments for ecosystem services (PES) have gained widespread prominence as a flagship solution for ecological challenges and attracts multi-billion-dollar annual investments. This large-scale meta-analysis analyzes the epistemic, methodological, and ethical–political assumptions of over 1,000 peer-reviewed articles on PES from 2005 to 2019. Results highlight that effectiveness of PES outcomes, design of PES policy, and market-based valuation of ecosystem services serve as predominant thematic focus areas for research. Considerations such as gender equality, power asymmetries, and the recognition of multiple relational values around human-nature interactions in PES, have received much less attention. Despite research recommendations from the literature emphasizing the need for greater social contextualization in future PES research, much of the literature remains decontextualized from political histories of the territory shaping local social and ecological relations. Results also demonstrate a clear presence of Global North institutions dominating where the scientific expertise on PES is assembled (representing 73% of studies), while 81% of studies collect their empirical data in the Global South. This asymmetry in where knowledge gets generated and extracted is mirrored by methodological homogeneity that risks reproducing a colonial bias of remote and universal expertise. The analysis also demonstrates the extent to which PES gets hyped as a proposed solution to ecological challenges often without any credible evidence. Decontextualized speculation around success, research that ‘helicopters’ into locations to introduce and make PES fit for purpose, and the highly asymmetrical control of the PES research agenda between Global North and South risks worsening social and ecological crises on the ground.

Collective agency and positive political theory.

Positive political theorists typically deny the possibility of collective agents by understanding aggregation problems to imply that groups are not rational decision-makers. This view contrasts with List and Pettit's view that such problems actually imply the necessity of accounting for collective agents in explanations of group behaviour. In this paper, I explore these conflicting views and ask whether positive political theorists should alter their individualist analyses of groups like legislatures, political parties, and constituent assemblies. I show how we fail to appreciate the significance of strategic voting and agenda control by treating groups as agents. I, therefore, conclude that positive political theorists should cling to their individualist approach and maintain that groups are not agents.

Agenda Control under Policy Uncertainty

AbstractModels of agenda setting are central to the analysis of political institutions. Elaborations of the classical agenda‐setting model of Romer–Rosenthal have long been used to make predictions about policy outcomes and the distribution of influence among political actors. Although the canonical model is based on complete and perfect information about preferences and policy outcomes, some extensions relax these assumptions to include uncertainty about preferences and reversion points. We consider a different type of uncertainty: incomplete knowledge of the mapping between policies and outcomes. In characterizing the optimal agenda setting under this form of uncertainty, we show that it amends substantively the implications of the Romer–Rosenthal model. We then extend the model dynamically and show that rich dynamics emerge under policy uncertainty. Over a longer horizon, we find that agenda control suppresses the incentive of legislators to experiment with policy, leading to less policy learning and worse outcomes than are socially efficient.

Agenda Control and Reciprocity in Sequential Voting Decisions

Agenda Control and Reciprocity in Sequential Voting Decisions

Authoritarian Power Sharing: Concepts, Mechanisms, and Strategies

We provide a unified language for studying power sharing in authoritarian regimes. Power-sharing deals entail not only sharing spoils between a ruler and challenger, but also establishing an enforcement mechanism. An arrangement does not truly share power without reallocating power to make it costly for the ruler to renege. Institutional concessions, such as delegating agenda control over policy decisions or empowering third-party enforcers, can reallocate power. However, weak institutions create a Catch-22 that inhibits credible commitment. When institutions are weak, self-enforcing power sharing is still possible if challengers have coercive means to defend their spoils. However, challengers can leverage their coercive capabilities to overthrow the ruler. This double-edged sword implies that a strategic dictator shares power only under specific conditions: challengers can credibly punish an autocratic ruler; if the ruler shares power, the challenger must willingly forgo taking harmful actions; and the ruler willingly acquiesces to diminished power and rents.

Low Traffic Neighbourhoods and the Paradox of UK Government Control of the Active Travel Agenda

AbstractLow traffic neighbourhoods (LTNs) are designed to remove motorised traffic from residential streets, while leaving them permeable to pedestrians and cyclists, and they have become a popular means to promote active travel. During the recent pandemic, the government introduced the Active Travel Fund in England to facilitate the rapid implementation of LTNs, but this also resulted in a powerful top‐down control element. This in turn has resulted in a paradox where funding is contingent on certain conditions being met, but insufficient and changing guidance has been given to the local authorities charged with implementation. This article outlines this highly unpredictable process, the controversies and the uncertain implementation through the development of the LTN process in England and the experience of Oxford, where many of the issues are currently being confronted.

Knowledge and Awareness of Vitamin D Among Pregnant or Lactating Iraqi Refugee Women: a Call for Different Approaches in Health Education and Outreach

Vitamin D deficiency during pregnancy and lactation has negative impacts on maternal, fetal, and infant health. Low health literacy and other social determinants of health may increase the risk of deficiency among refugee women. This qualitative study used a survey and in-depth individual interviews to examine knowledge of vitamin D among ten pregnant or breastfeeding Iraqi refugee women in the United States, and sought participants’ recommendations on culture-centered and participatory health promotion strategies. All participants reported having insufficient information and understanding of vitamin D, its health benefits, and the risks of deficiency. The four primary themes that emerged from the interviews were the quality of available vitamin D information, barriers to seeking such information, intersectionality of health and environment, and power differentials and the control of the health agenda. Participants’ recommendations included bridging the language barrier and training health care providers to deliver the information needed to raise awareness. The findings of this study provide an opportunity for public health systems to design culture-centered health education and promotion strategies to ensure vitamin D adequacy among this vulnerable population.

Who Securitizes? Climate Change Discourse in the United Nations

AbstractWhen and why do states reframe issues as security problems? Which states advocate for these shifts? While securitization theory predicts that states that are existentially threatened by a problem are most likely to attempt to securitize it, I argue that accounting for the dynamics of institutional agendas can better explain this phenomenon. States that stand to gain agenda control as a result of securitization are likely to rhetorically attempt to securitize, while those that are materially interested in the issue are less likely to do so. I test this theory in the case of the climate change in the United Nations, leveraging data on speeches in the General Assembly. I provide the first quantitative test of the securitization of climate politics, finding that P5 states securitize to expand their agenda control, while Small Island Developing States do not securitize, contra previous expectations. I further find that the overall climate discourse cannot be characterized as securitized. These findings imply that the Security Council is unlikely to be significantly involved in climate change policy and also demonstrate the importance of rhetoric for political outcomes and for the distribution of state power within international organizations.

Agenda Control in the Indian Parliament and the Impact on its Oversight Function – Analysis and Evidence

Separation of powers is understood as the diffusion of powers among different branches of the government, with each branch acting as a check on the other. This principle is considered an anti-thesis to totalitarianism, preventing the absolute concentration of power and thus protecting liberty. The Cabinet-style parliamentary form of government, with its genesis in Britain, fused together the executive with the legislature. This resulted in powerful executives and weakened legislatures with limited oversight capabilities. As institutions evolved over time, internal rules and procedures also evolved both as constraints and enablers of executive dominance, by distributing the powers of agenda control. Agenda control, understood as the power to decide what gets on the agenda, is a contested notion between the executive and the legislature. While there have been studies exploring agenda control in the context of the United States Congress and parliaments in several European countries, a similar study in the context of the Indian Parliament is yet to emerge. This paper attempts to examine the rules and procedures of the Indian Parliament to determine who controls the agenda, and what impact this control has on the oversight function of Parliament. For this purpose, the paper will limit itself to procedures pertaining to convening and proroguing a session, deciding the time and agenda for legislative discourse, and controlling deliberations on financial matters. The paper ends by making some recommendations on the reform of these rules and procedures, so as to ensure a greater sharing of the power of agenda control between the executive and the legislature in India.

Legislative Democracy in the Bundestag After Reunification

ABSTRACT This article assesses the impact of reunification on the Bundestag from a historical institutionalist perspective. Accordingly, it focuses on procedural development and parties’ behaviour. More specifically, it analyses parties’ control of the legislative agenda and their willingness to obstruct this agenda. Prior to reunification, the Bundestag emerged as a working legislature with decentralised agenda control. Even though the Bundestag was vulnerable to obstruction, especially by questioning the quorum, obstructive behaviour virtually ceased after 1951. After reunification, the Bundestag’s vulnerability was increased when a plenary ‘core time’ was introduced in 1995. However, all parties, including the one most directly related to reunification, the Left Party, continued to abstain from exploiting procedural loopholes. Only the AfD as the other post-1990 newcomer (albeit less directly related to reunification) did so by questioning the quorum to an unprecedented extent after it entered the Bundestag in 2017. So far, this systematic obstruction has only led to a path-dependent procedural reform. If, however, the AfD continues with this behaviour, it can be regarded as a threat to legislative democracy at least indirectly related to German reunification.

Bill Text and Agenda Control in the US Congress

The study of agenda power has largely been the study of negative agenda power. But standard measures of negative agenda power are insufficient to measure the majority’s agenda choices: they only co...

The Democratic-CIO Alliance: The Benefits of Friendship

The Democratic-CIO Alliance: The Benefits of Friendship

Agenda Control and Timing of Bill Initiation: A Temporal Perspective on Coalition Governance in Parliamentary Democracies

Although democratic governance imposes temporal constraints, the timing of government policy making activities such as bill initiation is still poorly understood. This holds especially under coalition governments, in which government bills need to find approval by a partner party in parliament. We propose a dynamic temporal perspective in which ministers do not know whether they face a cooperative or competitive partner at the beginning of a term, but they learn this over time and use their agenda control to time further bill initiation in response. A circular regression analysis using data on more than 25,000 government bills from 11 parliamentary democracies over 30 years supports this temporal perspective, showing that ministers initiate bills later in the term when their previous bills have experienced greater scrutiny. Ministers further delay bill initiation when coalition parties’ incentives to deviate from compromise increase and when they have less power to constrain their bills’ scrutiny.

Crossing Over: Majority Party Control Affects Legislator Behavior and the Agenda

Does majority party control cause changes in legislative policy making? We argue that majority party floor control affects legislator behavior and agenda control. Leveraging a natural experiment where nearly one tenth of a legislature’s members died within the same legislative session, we are able to identify the effect of majority party floor control on the legislative agenda and on legislator choices. Previous correlational work has found mixed evidence of party effects, especially in the mid-twentieth century. In contrast, we find that majority party control leads to (1) changes in the agenda and (2) changes in legislators’ revealed preferences. These effects are driven by changes in numerical party majorities on the legislative floor. The effects are strongest with Republican and nonsouthern Democratic legislators. The effects are also more pronounced on the first (economic) than the second (racial) dimension. Additional correlational evidence across 74 years adds external validity to our exogenous evidence.

Majority Party Agenda Setting: Picking Fights or Avoiding Them?

In legislatures such as the U.S. House of Representatives, where the majority party controls the agenda, the frequency of observed partisan disagreement is partially a function of strategic agenda‐setting choices made by that party. Do majority party leaders use their agenda control to privilege bills that accentuate disagreements with the minority party? In this paper, we develop a theoretical framework focused on the costs and benefits associated with floor consideration of partisan legislation. We test hypotheses derived from our theory on a dataset of 15,611 bills considered in House committees during the 104th–114th Congresses (1995–2016). We find that minority party opposition in committee is associated with a decreased likelihood of floor consideration, suggesting that the majority party does not use agenda setting to indiscriminately favor partisan legislation. Our findings focus attention on the costs of partisan agenda setting, and contextualize the partisan disagreement we ultimately observe on the House floor.