Good Governance and the Partisan Wars: The Effects of Divided Government on Administrative Problem Solving and Oversight Agenda Setting in Congress

Abstract

Abstract Congress’s constitutional responsibility to oversee and investigate the executive branch of government demands that instances of waste, fraud, and abuse in the administrative state be checked via both legislation and nonlegislative committee hearings. In this article, I establish an oversight agenda for Congress using the nonpartisan Government Accountability Office's (GAO) biennial identification of the most vulnerable federal agencies and programs. I then assess whether and how government-wide partisanship affects Congress’s ability to address this slate of issues. I find that, when government is divided, Congress is more legislatively productive on high-risk issues, and the House of Representatives is more likely to prioritize investigative hearings on high-risk issues. My results suggest a silver lining to the reality of partisan agenda control: preexisting administrative problems identified by well-positioned and well-informed observers at GAO may get more attention when there is a partisan incentive for the legislature to investigate an opposition-controlled government.