Philosophy Of Action Research Articles

May Philosophy Flourish: Pantheisticon, Freemasonry, and Eighteenth-Century Ritual Philosophy

In eighteenth-century Europe, ritual performance behavior was consciously used for philosophical purposes. The richest documented instances of this involved Freemasonry, a voluntary fraternal order that drew tens of thousands of men, across Europe and beyond, into a secretive ritual practice. Masons understood ritual, the core of Masonic “craft,” as a philosophical activity in itself. Supporting this claim requires a critique of the prevalent view that Freemasonry was uniquely compatible with specific Enlightenment philosophical constructs—constitutional monarchism in political thought and deistic Newtonianism in natural philosophy. Rather than expressing these specific philosophical views, Masonic ritual effectuated philosophical reflection apart from the outside world. John Toland's proto-Masonic ritual document Pantheisticon shows how early modern rituals fostered thinking in lodge settings and distinguished between Masonic and “profane” entities. On this basis it can be argued that performance in this era and beyond should be understood as the generative containment of knowledge.

Karakteritega suhestumine, netimisogüünia ja representatsioonide materiaalsus

The present multidisciplinary theoretical article develops its focal line of argument gradually. At first, feminist and narrative theory are consulted; after that, some treatments in the philosophy of mind are discussed. The latter’s correlative relationship with the recent “materialist turn” in philosophy affords to propose a tentative alternative to the current and universally accepted approaches to the (fictional) character much indebted to philosophical idealism. This latter observation also determines the broad – some might argue seemingly overtly complicated – theoretical reach of the article. However, its timely point of departure – the online misogynistic abuse in fan discussions directed at Breaking Bad’s Skyler White and the actress Anna Gunn –, enables to cast the issue of character engagement in necessarily broad terms, disciplinarily speaking. Be it in the context of different scientific disciplines or as the crucial vertebra connecting them, whilst also suggesting far-reaching philosophical implications. This kind of engagement, and especially its expression in online discourse, provides an impetus to inquire about the peculiarities of the human mind and the operation of human thought. Therefore, the present article zooms in on the conventionally understood binary relationship between “fiction” and “reality”, sketching appropriate terminology (continuance, narrative person, realitization) and theoretical framework (inspired, in part, by the Soviet school of philosophical Activity Theory) to help explain the human proclivity to treat characters in naïve realist terms, i.e., as real people. The central research question is as follows: what kind of ramifications can be detected for the conceptualization of character (and narrative) engagement from a particular kind of value-laden reception (like the forms of digital misogyny that emerged in the context of Breaking Bad’s reception)?

Protection philosophy for distribution grids with high penetration of distributed generation✰

Distributed Generation (DG) can cause several problems in electrical systems that are not prepared to deal with these new sources: situations such as bidirectional power flow and large variations in short-circuit current values. This article presents changes in the actual distribution systems protection philosophy that intend to make the protection system always work properly and reliably eliminate any short-circuit. Furthermore, it shows that the actual philosophy is inefficient in systems with high DG penetration level and, through modifications in the actual philosophy, using available functions in the protection devices, it is possible to increase the reliability and assertiveness of the protection system for any fault.

The Eventful Character of Bibikhin's Philosophical Thought

The article deals with the event-related aspects of V.V. Bibikhin's philosophical activities on the material of his lectures, texts and communication with contemporaries (S.S. Horuzhy, S.S. Averintsev and A.V. Akhutin). The eventfulness of the transfer of knowledge from teacher to student, as well as the unity of thought, word and life are the principles of teaching philosophy derived from the pedagogical experience of V.V. Bibikhin. He was a follower of A.F. Losev and M. Heidegger focusing his thoughts on clarifying ontological problems. Ontological thought is paradoxical in its own nature. This is revealed in the reading and interpretation of Bibikhin's writings, as well as in the evidence of his polemical communication with colleagues. One of the brightest ontological disputes of recent times is the discussion of V.V. Bibikhin and S.S. Horuzhy about the concept of energy which is an essential ontological category. These prominent Russian thinkers had a long-term friendship that included an element of intellectual rivalry. The author calls such communication “friendship in struggle” which has a paradoxical character. The philosophical definition of friendship presented in the book “The Pillar and Statement of Truth” by P.A. Florensky which has an antinomic character is used in the text. The paradoxical event and the polemic nature of V.V. Bibikhin's thought manifests itself in his works and correspondence with friends. The article provides illustrative examples of these moments of his intellectual creativity. V.V. Bibikhin is one of those thinkers who preserve the Russian philosophical tradition in the context of its disputes with other national traditions.

Событийный характер философской мысли В. Бибихина

The article deals with the event-related aspects of V.V. Bibikhin's philosophical activities on the material of his lectures, texts and communication with contemporaries (S.S. Horuzhy, S.S. Averintsev and A.V. Akhutin). The eventfulness of the transfer of knowledge from teacher to student, as well as the unity of thought, word and life are the principles of teaching philosophy derived from the pedagogical experience of V.V. Bibikhin. He was a follower of A.F. Losev and M. Heidegger focusing his thoughts on clarifying ontological problems. Ontological thought is paradoxical in its own nature. This is revealed in the reading and interpretation of Bibikhin's writings, as well as in the evidence of his polemical communication with colleagues. One of the brightest ontological disputes of recent times is the discussion of V.V. Bibikhin and S.S. Horuzhy about the concept of energy which is an essential ontological category. These prominent Russian thinkers had a long-term friendship that included an element of intellectual rivalry. The author calls such communication “friendship in struggle” which has a paradoxical character. The philosophical definition of friendship presented in the book “The Pillar and Statement of Truth” by P.A. Florensky which has an antinomic character is used in the text. The paradoxical event and the polemic nature of V.V. Bibikhin's thought manifests itself in his works and correspondence with friends. The article provides illustrative examples of these moments of his intellectual creativity. V.V. Bibikhin is one of those thinkers who preserve the Russian philosophical tradition in the context of its disputes with other national traditions.

Philosophy’s Workmate:Erōsand theErōticain Plato’sSymposium

AbstractDiotima’s speech claims that philosophy ranks among theerōtica. The standard reading of this holds thaterōsmanifests in philosophical activity. This is puzzling. Eros has a reputation for overpowering the psyche, making reasoning impossible. The major interpretive discussion of this puzzle suggests that Diotima (and Plato by proxy) must therefore accept either non-rationalist philosophizing or rationalisterōs. This paper argues for an alternative. The “ancillary activities view” posits that theerōticado not manifesterōsbut are activities undertaken to achieve itstelos. On this view, love’s relationship to philosophy is as un-mysterious as wanting something and doing what it takes to get it.

Heideggers Denken: Anmerkungen zur Rezeptionsgeschichte der Philosophie

This article approaches the problematizing of the Reception of Heidegger’s thought and the way in which philosophical practice has been carried out in the university environment. It is about supporting the thesis that the great relevance of Heidegger's thought consists in defending the autonomy of thought in relation to other forms of manifesting existence. In this sense, the History of Philosophy was consolidated, in spite of what is sought to defend here, as a history of receptions, strongly determined by the objectification of thinking and the maintenance of fixed actuation structures. Thus, we intend to show that Heidegger's philosophy preserves an important instrument to fight against the sedimentation of thinking into works, against the stagnation of philosophical activity itself. Keywords: Heidegger. History of Philosophy. Philosophical Reception.

Begriff (Concept)

The lexeme Begriff marks Goethe’s ongoing reconstruction of the traditional philosophical concept across a variety of disciplinary practices. In its most developed articulations, it also works transcendentally to establish the conditions of possibility for thought and intelligibility on a dynamic plane of verbal experimentation and reinvention that cuts immanently through the world. Unlike the clear and distinct concepts of rationalist metaphysics, which function as fixed universals beyond the reach of the senses, Goethe’s extensive usages and ongoing conceptualizations of Begriff draw on an expressive power within language to generate sequences of cognitive moves and moments of transitional understanding that stand in close relation to each other and can be gathered in graded series to be saved for further observation, description, reflection, and reconfiguration. Through its successive linguistic manifestations, moreover, and in line with Goethe’s heterodox approach to systematic philosophy, Begriff lays out force fields of verbal and philosophical activity and discovery with fluid and permeable borders. In ways comparable to the power of reflective judgment in Kant’s third critique, which dispenses with the categories of the understanding and their determining judgments to work intuitively within the world of living forms (Gestalten), Goethe’s lebendiger Begriff (living concept) proves to be a more encompassing structure of thought and its processes than the conceptual machinery of orthodox metaphysical systems with their regulatory regimes of limit-setting terms. Redeployed as an experimental object of experience, Begriff is, therefore, also anschaulich (visual, accessible to intuition). By offering a dynamic perspective onto the fugitive things of the world—including its thought things—it continually reveals the hidden secrets of its own perpetual becomings.

The article is dedicated to the anniversary of Boris Vasilyevich Markov, the famous philosopher of Saint Petersburg, Russia. The author of the article, basing on many years of personal experience and professional communication with the hero of the day, presents an expressive and holistic image of Markov as a person and as a philosopher according to his biography and creativity.

The article examines the epistemological parameters of the phenomenon of expert examination as well as the social and cognitive features of using scientific knowledge to substantiate the objectivity of expert evaluations. Today, the scope of expert activities has significantly expanded. Accordingly, the number of studies, including philosophical ones, considering this phenomenon, in particular, has increased primarily in connection with the growth of its role in assessing the social-humanitarian risks associated with the introduction of scientific-technical advances. At the same time, attention is directed to the fact that it is precisely due to the significant expansion of the scope of expert activity that the nature of the expert examination itself is distorted — its dependence on social contexts is increasing, but its objectivity is lost. The article aims to clarify the reasons for the growth of this dependence in connection with the specificity of the epistemological parameters of knowledge, which is used as a scientific basis for expert evaluations. This aspect of expert examination, as a rule, falls out of sight of both its researchers and the experts themselves. Modern philosophers and methodologists of science state the direct dependence of expert examination on applied (i. e., limited to practical requests) developments, while, in the author’s opinion, the condition for the objectivity of expert opinions is the obligatory appeal of experts to fundamental science, motivated by the commitment to expand the sphere of holistic knowledge concerning the world. This condition is highlighted due to the epistemological perspective of comprehending expert evaluations, which makes it possible to include additional criteria for their objectivity in the sphere of the expert’s self-awareness. The actualization of such criteria, according to the author, is now becoming a prerequisite for an effective expert examination that maintains a high social status.

Философ на службе у термидорианской республики и императора: к политической биографии Мен де Бирана

The article analyzes the peculiarities of the political philosophy of the ancestor of French spiritualism based on documents published at the turn of the 20th–21st centuries. The specificity of his worldview in the early period of philosophical activity is considered, as well as the reasons that prompted him to turn to politics after the Thermidorian coup. Negative attitude towards the Jacobeans, regrets about the fall of the monarchy are very characteristic of his views during this period. He meets the Thermidorian republic and then the empire with hopes for close peace, social stability, based on strict observance of laws. At first, he praises Napoleon as a genius who “pacifies and comforts”. But then comes disappointment, a continuous sequence of wars leads him to condemn the Napoleonic policy as part of the “commission of five” of legislative corps in December 1813. The philosopher meets the restoration as an event consistent with the plans of Providence. Undoubtedly, the appeal to religious philosophy was largely motivated by Biran's political experience.

Classical Indian Philosophy: A History of Philosophy Without Any Gaps by Peter Adamson and Jonardon Ganeri

Reviewed by: Classical Indian Philosophy: A History of Philosophy Without Any Gaps by Peter Adamson and Jonardon Ganeri Joerg Tuske (bio) Classical Indian Philosophy: A History of Philosophy Without Any Gaps. Volume 5. By Peter Adamson and Jonardon Ganeri. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020. Pp. xxiv + 397. Hardcover $32.95, ISBN 978-0-19-885176-9. "I cannot recommend this book highly enough!" Is this statement true or have I succeeded in lavishing enough praise on this book by writing this statement, making this statement in fact false? This is one way in which Adamson and Ganeri explain the view of the Buddhist philosopher Nāgārjuna that everything is empty. (However, humble as they are, they use the movies of Buster Keaton instead of their own book as an example.) Nāgārjuna has to defend himself against the objection that if everything is "empty" then this surely also applies to his own view. He famously argues that he does not have a thesis and provides the "silence" analogy, which I want to illustrate using my own example: if there is too much off-topic chatter in class and I want students to be quiet and pay attention I could shout "silence!" in order to create silence but of course my act of shouting itself is the opposite of silence. Nevertheless, it can bring about silence and Nāgārjuna claims that his view that everything is empty could be an instrument to make "Brahmanical (and other) dogmatists" aware of this. In Classical Indian Philosophy, the fifth volume of transcripts from the excellent podcast History of Philosophy Without Any Gaps, and the first to discuss philosophers with no direct connection to ancient Greece, Peter Adamson has teamed up with Jonardon Ganeri to provide a comprehensive, fascinating, and fun account of the history of philosophy on the Indian sub-continent up until the Buddhist philosopher Dignāga (c. 480–540 CE) with many glimpses of philosophical developments beyond Dignāga's time. (Listeners of the podcast series might know that Adamson is also collaborating with Chike Jeffers on a podcast series on Africana Philosophy, which I hope will eventually appear in book form as well.) Classical Indian Philosophy is divided into four parts: in the first part ("Origins") the authors provide an introduction to philosophy in India and then discuss the background to any philosophical activity in India, namely the Vedas, the Upaniṣads, the Mahābhārata (including a chapter on the Bhagavad-gītā) and the Buddha's teachings. The second part, entitled "The age of the sūtra," [End Page 1] gives a thorough overview of what is often called "the six orthodox schools" (Sāṃkhya, Yoga, Mīmāṃsā, Vedānta, Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika). Part three adds Buddhist and Jaina philosophy while part four ("Beyond ancient India") introduces miscellaneous topics, such as "The aesthetics of Rasa," "Tantra," two chapters on the (possible) influence of Indian philosophy on Greek, Islamic and later European thought, as well as a brief glimpse of philosophy after Dignāga. While my rendering of the outline of the book seems as if it could apply to any number of histories of Indian philosophy, there are several points that make this book stand out. Listeners of the podcast already know that the authors are not afraid to resort to the occasional pun in order to get a point across and I am happy to say that all of them (as far as I can tell) made it into the book version. With that in mind, I want to offer the cliché that Classical Indian Philosophy is a tour de force but what makes it stand out from traditional histories is that there is nothing forced about it. This is partly due to the fact that this book (as the previous volumes) is written as a series of podcasts. This makes for a much more engaging style than is found in standard accounts of the history of philosophy (Indian, European, or otherwise). Listeners of the first four seasons of the podcast or readers of the first volumes will be familiar with Adamson's frequent references to giraffes as contents of our beliefs...

From heart to image: In honor of the 75th anniversary of professor B. V. Markov

The article is dedicated to the anniversary of Boris Vasilyevich Markov, the famous philosopher of Saint Petersburg, Russia. The author of the article, basing on many years of personal experience and professional communication with the hero of the day, presents an expressive and holistic image of Markov as a person and as a philosopher according to his biography and creativity. An attempt is made to consider the complex philosophical evolution of Markov, which took place in key periods for Russian philosophy when Russian thought actively absorbed the key philosophical texts of the 20th century that had become available. Markov is distinguished by a unique ability to creatively rethink a variety of philosophical trends — classical philosophical schools, phenomenology, existentialism, hermeneutics, analytical philosophy, structuralism — actualizing their significance for modern philosophy and synthesizing their experience in their original understanding. The specificity of Markov’s oral and written language is distinguished by its expressiveness, brightness and aphorism. It is no coincidence that the philosophy of language had a great influence on his philosophical development, remaining as one of the main research topics throughout all his works. Touching upon some of the key books of Professor Markov, written by him at different times, the author strives to briefly mention and analyze the main features of his philosophical style, thinking, and worldview. Special attention is paid to philosophical anthropology, which is directly related to the philosophical activity of the hero of the day over the past few decades. In this regard, emphasis is given to Markov’s book “Mind and Heart”, which marked the beginning of the most productive period of his philosophical work, which is currently associated with the problems of visual anthropology of communication.

HUMANCENTRISM AS A BASIC CATEGORY OF PHILOSOPHY OF ECONOMICS OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

Aim. Theoretical and methodological substantiation of the concept of people-centeredness as a basic category of sustainable development economy in order to form a basis for further study of the economic system through the prism of the concept of sustainable development. Method. Analysis of scientific literature on current trends in philosophy of economics, problems of human-centric approach in economics, research and critique of anthropocentrism. Results. The analysis is carried out and the methodological bases of rethinking the role and place of human in the structure and processes of economic activity are singled out. It is determined that modern trends in the philosophy of economics form new models, methods, and laws of management. It is noted that the change of priorities of socio-economic development transforms the theoretical and methodological foundations of research and the actual philosophy of economics. In turn, there is a need for more in-depth research and the use of new approaches and tools. The prospects of the research results are to form the basis for a qualitative new study of the economics of sustainable development, in particular using a holistic approach. Opportunities and prospects for studying economic processes based on the concept of holism are prospects for further research. Scientific novelty. The place and role of the concept of anthropocentrism as a basic category of sustainable development economy are substantiated, as well as key trends in the philosophy of economics in this context are identified. Practical significance. The results of the study allow asserting the formation of a new array of theoretical and methodological data that require more detailed research and conceptualization. Humancentrism as a basic category of the economy of sustainable development forms new perspectives for the study of economic processes and reflects changes in the philosophy of economic thought in general.

Friedrich Nietzsche about “the Free Minds”

Introduction. The theme of “free minds”, which Nietzsche developed during his philosophical career, occupies an important place in his creative heritage. In a sense, it is a further development of Plato’s doctrine of the “true philosopher”, the bearer of exemplary piety and reason. By means of mental constructs “free mind”, “knowing man”, “theoretical man”, “free philosopher”, “Zarathustra” F. Nietzsche not only deeply and fully showed the creative principle of creative personalities, but also revealed the complex, sometimes their tragic life, because he often wrote about himself. The aim of the study is to trace the meaningful evolution of this important topic in the philosophy and life of the German philosopher. Materials and Methods. The works of F. Nietzshe served as the source of the research. In the course of the work, the method of thematic cultural analysis was used, which makes it possible to track the meaningful development of the main philosophical themes, their semantic interrelationships in the conceptual constructions of the philosopher. And also, the method of existential-transcendental analysis was used, with the help of which the opportunity opened up to study the living conditions and spiritual aspirations of the German philosopher. Discussion. “Free minds” always have to prove their right to exist. Unlike “bound minds”, they should strive to free themselves from petty connections and relationships in everyday life. In the guise of Zarathustra, F. Nietzsche created an almost ascetic image of a “free mind” that “scorched by the sun” in the desert, “hungry, strong and lonely” “breaks his heart”. If for Plato the highest ability of a person was his mind, which provided transcendental knowledge of metaphysical being, then for F. Nietzsche this was the volitional principle. Surviving the “great break” is a universal law for all “free minds” discovered by Nietzsche. He captured the moment of the “birth” of the “free mind”, the initial impulse, which will largely determine his further life path. Spiritual loneliness and independence are an indispensable condition for the life of a “free mind”. The last phase in the formation of a “free mind” is the realization of his fate as a lonely wanderer, destined and doomed to create new truths, values and ideas. Results. The great philosopher F. Nietzsche has always been a transcendental person, a genuine “free mind”, which predetermined the depth of his philosophical thought. In the last years of his philosophical activity, nihilistic attitudes began to gain strength, which led to an exacerbation of the conflict in his psyche. Therefore, the doctrine of the “free mind” is one of the main philosophical achievements of Friedrich Nietzsche.

Sacré et transcendence: Discours spirituel et philosophique

Philosophy is historically a theoretical as well as a theoretical practice and activity. However, in its history, it was forced, for reasons internal and external to its history and its disciplinary form, as much as to its epistemological regime, to distinguish itself from both theology and mysticism or the spirituality. However, it was defined in its genealogy as a metaphysics or a science of being and truth. How are transcendence and the sacred articulated in philosophical praxis? What role does the relationship to oneself and to tell the truth play in philosophical activity? What place does the history of truth and the ontology of the self constitute in the production of truths in philosophy? And, finally, what does the subject of philosophical action have to engage in itself so that it is constantly confronted with registering its being in a practice of truth and knowledge, and, at the same time, incarnating existentially in a logic where freedom and knowledge engage specific and singular forms of life, specific to the philosophical life defined as relation to oneself, to the other, to the world?

VL. Solovyov and N.I. Kareev: the question of the creative history of the “Justification of the Moral Good”

The following essay analyzes the context in which Vl. Solovyov wrote his philosophical treatise “Justification of the Moral Good”. Such an analysis is a necessary condition for a conscientious reconstruction of the treatise’s creative history and thus for a proper analysis of the concepts and ideas expressed therein. The aim of this study is a detailed restoration of the intellectual atmosphere in which Solovyov's work was created. Such a project requires a turn to the philosophical activities of less eminent contemporaries of Solovyov, including N.I. Kareev, whose work Solovyov closely followed, responding to him not just critically, but also with a certain amount of sympathy. We also take up here a well-known discussion between the two concerning the philosophy of history and the theory of the historical process. Solovyov's position in this discussion is shown as containing the kernel of a plan embodied in the parts of the “Justification” dealing with social philosophy and philosophy of history. In addition, a textual, conceptual, and comparative analysis of Solovyov’s treatise shows that Kareev’s scholarly activity was an important factor in the intellectual context in which the plan of the treatise arose, was realized, and corrected. The essay also examines the notes in the text of the Justification that are complementary to N. Kareev (and to N. Mikhailovsky) and that were deleted by the author in preparing the 1899 edition. As we know, this later edition became the basis of all subsequent editions and reprintings. We see that Solovyov was sympathetic and to a certain degree close not only to Kareev's attempts to create an integral philosophical and historical standpoint, but also to his ideas about the high historical vocation of the individual. However, he was also sympathetic to the general pathos of Kareev’s theory, which consists in understanding moral activity as a key factor in historical change, taking the historical process as a sphere of the objectification of moral ideals.

Материалистическая «этика войны» в проекте марксистского изучения семьи и брака в белорусской советской философии в 1920-е гг.

The research studies the formation of materialist “ethics of war” in Belarusian Soviet philosophy in the 1920s. It has been shown that despite the absence of special philosophical works on ethics during this period, the specificity of materialist ethics can be reconstructed on the basis of historical study of philosophy, in particular the Marxist interpretation of the philosophy of B. Spinoza. The specificity of the project of Marxist geneonomy as philosophical and sociological doctrine of family and marriage is analyzed. The geneonomy was developed in the 1920s by researchers from Minsk during the processes of transformation of family life and gender relations unfolding in the Soviet Union. These works combined socio-historical, philosophical and normative approaches for studying social phenomena, including war. The development of Marxist geneonomy is presented as one of the cases of a more general process of transferring foreign ideas and concepts in Belarusian social sciences and philosophy. The features of the geneonomic project and the role of the concepts of war and struggle, as well as their ethical assessment in the works of F. Müller-Lyer, whose ideas were adopted and transformed by Soviet researchers, are analyzed. The specificity of the materialist version of geneonomy as a scientific project is revealed. According the geneonomic works of the Belarusian philosopher S.Ya. Wolfson peculiarities of understanding war as a factor of social evolution throughout human history, analysis of the role of war in the dynamics of capitalist and Soviet societies and the development of family and marriage relations in them, the use of rhetorical means associated with the description of war and struggle for the analysis of scientific and philosophical activities were reconstructed. The main peculiarities of the Marxist-materialist version of the “ethics of war”, developed within the framework of the Belarusian Soviet philosophy and Marxist sociology in the 1920s, are shown. They are naturalistic and even sociologist vision of war; determinism in the acceptance of wars as an inevitable factor in the evolution of society; a dialectical assessment of the causes of war and its results; emphasis on the role of the collective good in the analysis of war and its consequences.

THE ROLE OF PHILOSOPHY AND LANGUAGE IN THE DIALOGUE CULTURAL

There is an overlook of the role of philosophy and language in the cultural dialogue due to the weakness of the philosophical dialogue in our country instead talking about his absence and lack of interest in language well and knowing its correct rules and foundations. Philosophical activity to us, it is non-existent that it is present in education, in programs of publishing houses, and in the activities of cultural institutions. There is a great discrepancy between Arab countries in their care, and it is regrettable that there is no comprehensive and objective picture of it that helps.

Noncognitivism in Metaethics and the Philosophy of Action

Noncognitivism about normative judgment is the view that normative judgment is a distinctive kind of mental state, identical neither to belief or desire, but desire-like in its functional role and direction of fit. Noncognitivism about intention (also called the “distinctive practical attitude” theory) is the view that intention is a distinctive kind of mental state, identical neither to belief or desire, but desire-like in its functional role and direction of fit. While these theories are alike in several ways, they have rarely been discussed in concert. This paper studies the relation between these two theories, focusing on the question of whether noncognitivism about intention faces an analogue of the well-known Frege-Geach problem for noncognitivism about normative judgment. I argue that whether it faces the Frege-Geach problem depends on how it treats the distinction between what Anscombe called expressions of intention and personal predictions. I show that there is substantial pressure to treat that distinction as semantic, and that a variant of the Frege-Geach problem arises for versions of noncognitivism about intention that go this route. Yet some philosophers of action may be willing to resist this pressure, and I develop a pragmatic account of the distinction that would allow such philosophers to avoid the Frege-Geach problem altogether. I argue that this pragmatic account has significant independent appeal. Notably, it provides a way for noncognitivists about intention to undercut the force of a recent argument for cognitivism due to Berislav Marušić and John Schwenkler.

Heideggers Denken. Anmerkungen zur Rezeptionsgeschichte der Philosophie

El presente artículo parte de la afirmación de que la historia de la filosofía se ha objetualizado en escritos, obras y discursos, que constituyen la base de su recepción. Se indaga en segundo lugar si esta recepción permite captar lo más propio de lo que es la filosofía y no solamente la comprensión de la misma desde la perspectiva europea. Con base en este punto de partida se reflexiona en torno al carácter propio de la filosofía en Martin Heidegger, resaltando la influencia de ésta más allá de su recepción académico-institucional (caso de los Cuadernos negros, por ejemplo). Los puntos fundamentales que se enuncian al respecto son: a) no se puede decir que Heidegger tenga una filosofía, pues él mismo no admite etiqueta alguna, b) si la actividad filosófica se convierte en una profesión –se institucionaliza–, cuya técnica consiste en poner simplemente en relación la lectura de textos, se pierde allí lo que realmente debe acontecer: el pensar mismo, c) es por ello que con el pensar mismo no se trata de resultados alrededor del conocimiento, sino de caminos y encaminamientos (Be-Wegung), d) tal pensar no produce conceptos estables, sino términos que en el movimiento del pensar se transforman y conducen a neologismos, e) de esta manera el asunto del pensar es un Nicht-Sache o un Un-Sache, algo no señalable, f) en la pregunta por el sentido del ser se despliega el espacio y el tiempo en el que se puede encaminar el pensar.