Account Of Sympathy Research Articles

Against Sympathy: Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments and the Regressive Politics of Likeness

ABSTRACT Reading The Theory of Moral Sentiments in dialog with civil rights struggles in the United States and with decolonial thinking more generally, this essay argues that sympathy constrains the conditions for social change by restricting the legibility of Black suffering. To demonstrate as much, this essay offers a close reading of Smith’s account of sympathy and of the impartial spectator, following which this essay reads #BlackLivesMatter as a hashtag and social movement whose advocacy is counteracted by antisympathetic rhetorics of white universalism, Black respectability, and masculine supremacy. In response, this essay argues in favor of decolonial acts of listening that occur in the context of a societal project of restorative justice because it is the persistence of reified colonial sympathy-allocation patterns in the United States and elsewhere that are driving the disproportionate impacts of anthropogenic climate change, COVID-19, and other historic events on nonwhite, nonmale people around the world.

Empathizing and Sympathizing With Robots: Implications for Moral Standing

This paper discusses the ethical nature of empathetic and sympathetic engagement with social robots, ultimately arguing that an entity which is engaged with through empathy or sympathy is engaged with as an “experiencing Other” and is as such due at least “minimal” moral consideration. Additionally, it is argued that extant HRI research often fails to recognize the complexity of empathy and sympathy, such that the two concepts are frequently treated as synonymous. The arguments for these claims occur in two steps. First, it is argued that there are at least three understandings of empathy, such that particular care is needed when researching “empathy” in human-robot interactions. The phenomenological approach to empathy—perhaps the least utilized of the three discussed understandings—is the approach with the most direct implications for moral standing. Furthermore, because “empathy” and “sympathy” are often conflated, a novel account of sympathy which makes clear the difference between the two concepts is presented, and the importance for these distinctions is argued for. In the second step, the phenomenological insights presented before regarding the nature of empathy are applied to the problem of robot moral standing to argue that empathetic and sympathetic engagement with an entity constitute an ethical engagement with it. The paper concludes by offering several potential research questions that result from the phenomenological analysis of empathy in human-robot interactions.

Elizabeth Hamilton on Sympathy and the Selfish Principle

In A Series of Popular Essays (1813 ) , Scottish philosopher Elizabeth Hamilton (1758–1816) identifies two ‘principles’ in the human mind: sympathy and the selfish principle. While sharing Adam Smith's understanding of sympathy as a capacity for fellow-feeling, Hamilton also criticizes Smith's account of sympathy as involving the imagination. Even more important for Hamilton is the selfish principle, a ‘propensity to expand or enlarge the idea of self’ that she distinguishes from both selfishness and self-love. Counteracting the selfish principle requires cultivating sympathy and benevolent affections from birth. Since no one can do this alone, Hamilton's prescription appeals ineliminably to the caregivers of the very young; and Hamilton was ahead of her time in claiming that these caregivers need not be female.

On the idea of intrinsic human worth

ABSTRACT This paper argues that the idea of intrinsic worth encompasses all human beings, no matter how they are circumstanced. This concept needs to be understood transcendentally, not prescriptively. These terms are explained, with particular reference to Kant. It also argues that discourses of identity and recognition can best be understood through the idea of human worth.  The paper suggests that human worth cannot be explicitly defined but needs to be expressed indirectly through signs and gestures. One way of doing this is through the invocation of sympathy and to this end a version of Hume's account of sympathy is presented. The paper concludes with some remarks as to how ‘human intrinsic worth’ might be incorporated into pedagogy.

Making sense of Smith on sympathy and approbation: other-oriented sympathy as a psychological and normative achievement

ABSTRACT Two problems seem to plague Adam Smith’s account of sympathy and approbation in The Theory of Moral Sentiments (TMS). First, Smith’s account of sympathy at the beginning of TMS appears to be inconsistent with the account of sympathy at the end of TMS. In particular, it seems that Smith did not appreciate the distinction between ‘self-oriented sympathy’ and ‘other-oriented sympathy’, that is, between imagining being oneself in the actor’s situation and imagining being the actor in the actor’s situation. Second, Smith’s account of approbation, according to which a sentiment of approval arises when there is recognition of concordance between the spectator’s sympathetic passion and the actor’s original passion, seems to face the following problem: since the spectator attains both his own sympathetic passion and the actor’s original passion by sympathizing with the actor, the sympathetic passion of the spectator and the original passion of the actor will necessarily be identical. Therefore, Smith’s account of approbation requires that the spectator utilize both self-oriented and other-oriented sympathy (‘the double-sympathy model of approbation’). I offer a novel developmental account of sympathy in TMS that renders Smith’s account of sympathy consistent and allows for the utilization of the double-sympathy model of approbation.

The language of sympathy: Hume on communication

ABSTRACTBy placing Hume’s account of communication in the context of some less known seventeenth- and eighteenth-century French resources on rhetoric and language, this essay argues that Hume based his understanding of verbal communication on a model that was rather widespread among his contemporaries. This model construes the capacity to engage with others through language as involving a much more fundamental affective capacity; that is, the capacity to affectively connect with the feelings and thoughts of other persons. Hume discusses this form of affective communication as part of his account of sympathy; and it is here that he provides us with the materials that suggest that the ability to reflect and ‘converse together on … reasonable terms’ (T 3.3.1.15, SBN 581) grows out of our basic affective responsiveness to other persons. With this conception of communication in place, it emerges that, for Hume, sympathy remains central even in his later works, where, as Jacqueline Taylor has recently argued, reflection and public processes of reasoning seem to take over many functions previously assigned to sympathy. This is because for him the capacity for reflective communication is best understood as being constitutively dependent on the unfolding of more basic sympathetic communications.

The Alliance of Virtue and Vanity in Hume's Moral Theory

AbstractIn this article I argue that vanity, the desire for and delight in the favorable opinion of others, plays a fundamental role in Hume's account of moral motivation. Hume says that vanity and virtue are inseparable, though he does not explicitly say how or why this should be. I argue that Hume's account of sympathy can explain this alliance. In resting moral sentiment on sympathy, Hume gives a fundamental role to vanity as it becomes either a mediating motive to virtue or else strengthens the otherwise weak motive of moral sentiment.

Relaxing a Tension in Adam Smith's Account of Sympathy

This paper attempts to relax the tension between Adam Smith's claim that sympathy involves an evaluative act of imaginative projection and his claim that sympathy involves a non-evaluative act of imaginative identification. The first section locates the tension specifically in the two different ways Smith depicts the stance adopted by the sympathizer. The second section argues that we can relax this tension by finding an important role for a non-evaluative stance in Smith's normative account of moral evaluation. This solution protects the continuity in Smith's account of sympathy (cf. Griswold 1999 : 99–103). Because of the particular way in which it renders intelligible the relationship between the evaluative and non-evaluative stances, this solution also emphasizes the importance that respect for the agent's conscience has in Smith's conception of an ideal moral judge (cf. Darwall 2004 ; 2006). The third section investigates a possible systematic basis for Smith's normative commitment to respectful moral judgment.

Teaching Ethics via Sympathy

Given the specific educational, psycholoqical, and socioloqical factors of juvenile inmates, I developed a course to teach such students moral concepts and reasoning without high level theorizing. I combined Hume's account of sympathy with current philosophical and psychological research to develop the students' natural sympathy as an aid in developing emotional, contextual, and moral literacy. In this paper, I explain (1) how the course developed the students' natural sympathy, (2) how sympathy can provide a simple and familiar process of moral deliberation, (3) how sympathy aids in learning moral concepts, and (4) some interesting implications for public policy regarding moral education and recidivism, early childhood moral education, and teaching ethics courses generally.

A Conversation between Annette Baier and Anik Waldow about Hume's Account of Sympathy

We discuss the variety of sorts of sympathy Hume recognizes, the extent to which he thinks our sympathy with others' feelings depends on inferences from the other's expression, and from her perceived situation, and consider also whether he later changed his views about the nature and role of sympathy, in particular its role in morals.

Humanity, sympathy and the puzzle of Hume's second enquiry

Here is a well-known and curious puzzle of Hume's second Enquiry: After going to great lengths to develop his associationist account of sympathy in Book II of the Treatise, and then using this acco...

Sympathy in Space(s)

In this essay the author explores the relation between sympathy and proximity in Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments. The essay proceeds in two parts. First, the author demonstrates that Smith’s description of our various attachments and affections, and the inevitable conflicts among them, draws us into the rich spatial texture of sympathetic response and stimulates further inquiry into a variety of spaces in which sympathetic activity takes place. In the second part, the author explores three such spaces—the physical, the affective, and the historical/cultural—to critique the way that some contemporary moral and political theorists have appropriated Smith’s account of sympathy as a tool for cosmopolitan aspirations. To what extent can Smith’s sympathy model detach us from and get us beyond the partiality and particularity generated by our physical, affective, and cultural entanglements

Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy

Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy

Sympathy and Other Selves

Hume Studies Volume XXII, Number 2, November 1996, pp. 255-271 Sympathy and Other Selves TONY PITSON Introduction Throughout Books II and III of the Treatise Hume makes considerable use of the notion of sympathy. For the most part this notion refers not to a feeling or passion as such, but rather to a kind of mechanism by which these and other mental states are communicated from one person to another. According to the way in which Hume describes this mechanism—for example, when it is first introduced in Treatise II i 11—it appears to operate as follows: we become aware of the sentiments or inclinations of someone else through their effects in that person's appearance and behaviour and in this way acquire an idea of the person's state of mind; and the idea which is thus acquired is then converted into an impression, so that we come to experience something comparable to the other person's own state of mind, as a result of the enlivening effect of the ever-present impression of self. Discussion of sympathy so understood tends to focus on the process in which our idea of the other person's state of mind is converted into the corresponding impression and the role played in this by the impression of self. As I intend to show, however, there are important questions about the way in which the idea itself is supposed to be acquired, and how this is to be reconciled with Hume's philosophical position both in the Treatise and elsewhere. In other words, the focus of the following discussion is the initial stage in the process which is supposed to result in our sharing the mental states of others. I believe we shall find that this—the epistemological—aspect of sympathy provides an important parallel to Hume's earlier treatment of the understanding. Tony Pitson is at the Department of Philosophy, University of Stirling, Stirling, FK9 4LA, Scotland. Email: aepl@forth.stirling.ac.uk 256 Antony E. Pitson Other Selves: The Epistemological Problem The topic of other selves is usually approached in philosophy from the perspective of both epistemology and the philosophy of mind. The epistemological issue is one concerning our knowledge of other selves. More precisely, what is at stake is the nature, extent and basis of such knowledge. Discussion of this issue often focuses on the question of whether we can, strictly speaking, be said to have knowledge of other selves at all. The reason why this question should have become the focus of discussion is one which deserves treatment in its own right. But it appears to arise from an underlying view of the nature of the self, viz., Descartes' dualism. The separation between mind and body involved in this doctrine leads naturally to the question as to whether the other beings by whom I am surrounded are anything more than just bodies. Is it not consistent with what I can observe that these other beings should be no more than machines?1 Do I therefore have any reason for supposing that I am not the sole worldly possessor of a mind? When we consider Hume's position in the light of this familiar way of regarding the issue of other selves, there is one striking fact which emerges immediately. This is that Hume appears to entertain no doubt whatsoever about our capacity for gaining awareness of the mental states of others—and, indeed, never directly addresses the issue of scepticism in this context. (Nor, we might note, does he hesitate to ascribe mental states to non-human animals—as, for example, in Treatise I iii 16). The existence of others as the subjects of mental states is presupposed both in Hume's discussion of the understanding in Book I of the Treatise, and also in his discussion of the passions—in particular, the indirect passions—in Book II. His account of sympathy, as we shall see, is one which in effect attempts to explain how it is possible for us to be aware of the contents of other people's minds. Since he nevertheless accepts some form of dualism (though not, as his discussion in Treatise I...

Sympathy, Simulation, and the Impartial Spectator

Hume observed that our minds are mirrors to one another: they reflect one another's passions, sentiments, and opinions.' This "sympathy," or "propensity we have to sympathize with others, to ... receive by communication [the] inclinations and sentiments [of others], however different from, or even contrary to, our own," he held to be the chief source of moral distinctions.2 Hume presented an account of how this mirroring of minds works. After a brief presentation of the account, I will show how it needs to be updated and corrected in the light of recent empirical research. Then I will give some reasons to think that the mirroring of minds is more pervasive than even Hume had thought: that mirroring is an essential part of the way in which we think about other minds. Finally, I will make some remarks about the relevance of mirroring to ethics.

Mackenzie's Man of Feeling: Embalming Sensibility

Mackenzie’s Man of Feeling: Embalming Sensibility Maureen Harkin This extreme sympathy with misfortunes... though it could be attained, would be perfectly useless, and could serve no other purpose than to render miserable the person who possessed it. —Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments. [E]very nobler feeling rises within me! every beat of my heart awakens a virtue!-but it will make you hate the world. —Henry Mackenzie, The Man of Feeling. One of the most consistent features of recent studies of British, and especially Scottish, writers of the mid-eighteenth century is the grounding assumption that these authors were engaged in a shared project of constructing community, and that their texts are important insofar as they succeed in producing workable models of such community. The concerns of Hume, Smith, and Henry Mackenzie with constructing a theory and practice of “sociability” (to use John Mullan’s term) for a changing society have been privileged in a number of readings of these authors by Mullan, Nicholas Phillipson, Richard Dwyer and others. In the face of the fragmentation of an increasingly complex and specialized society, a commercialism that challenged traditional forms of social filiation, and Scotland’s loss of sovereignty with the Act of Union, such arguments run, eighteenth-century Scottish writers and intellectuals, even more than their English counterparts, were under pressing obligations to consider and formulate responses to questions about what precisely constitutes a community. Their primary task was to explore or, more simply, to supply appropriate regulations and models for emulation in their texts. Hence readings of Hume that privilege his recasting the philosopher as a middleman facilitating exchange between the foreign realms of philosophy and polite society in his philosophical essays; of Smith’s The Theory of Moral Sentiments that describe the notion of sympathy elaborated there as a foundation and counter-force to the atomizing tendencies of the society of self-interested higglers found in his Wealth of Nations; and arguments that sentimental fiction, most fully represented by Mackenzie’s The Man of Feeling, provides, in its appeals [End Page 317] to common humanity and tableaux of sympathetic communion, a code of ethics based on sensibility to compensate for the erosion of traditional notions of social responsibility. 1 While constructing community is clearly a central concern in mid-century Anglo-Scottish literary-philosophical discourse, there are however several problems with some of these modern accounts of the issue. They have tended, first of all, to obscure the important difference between the need or desire to produce community and the success of that project. This has been evident in readings of Smith, for example, that, having identified a need for a counter-force to the isolating trends of Smith’s version of commercial society, read his account of sympathy in Moral Sentiments as supplying that force, despite Smith’s own obvious doubts about the tendency of sympathy to do so. 2 Moreover, in the case of the sentimental novel, the common assumption that the recurrent features of such fiction—its exhortations to sympathy or fellow-feeling and charitable benevolence—necessarily indicate a primary commitment to the project of constructing community have overlooked ways in which sentimental novels elude and actively challenge that characterization. 3 Sterne’s particular focus on the market appeal of sentimentalism in A Sentimental Journey (seeing financial opportunity rather than social responsibility in his response to the commercial context of his authorship) is one notable example. 4 Mackenzie’s popular novel, The Man of Feeling, with its reputation as that of the most typical, if not the most accomplished, sentimental novel, provides another, signal instance. The text has suffered from a certain critical neglect in more recent times. Those few readings of the novel that do accord it serious attention have approached it as an attempt to provide a model of practical morality for contemporaries in the figure of the man of feeling, Harley—one which unfortunately fails, given Harley’s general powerlessness and too-exacting standards. The characteristic sympathy with which Harley responds to the various scenes of distress and joy in which he finds himself is, according to Mullan, Dwyer and others, intended to furnish the basis for a workable ethics...