Sympathy and Other Selves

Abstract

Hume Studies Volume XXII, Number 2, November 1996, pp. 255-271 Sympathy and Other Selves TONY PITSON Introduction Throughout Books II and III of the Treatise Hume makes considerable use of the notion of sympathy. For the most part this notion refers not to a feeling or passion as such, but rather to a kind of mechanism by which these and other mental states are communicated from one person to another. According to the way in which Hume describes this mechanism—for example, when it is first introduced in Treatise II i 11—it appears to operate as follows: we become aware of the sentiments or inclinations of someone else through their effects in that person's appearance and behaviour and in this way acquire an idea of the person's state of mind; and the idea which is thus acquired is then converted into an impression, so that we come to experience something comparable to the other person's own state of mind, as a result of the enlivening effect of the ever-present impression of self. Discussion of sympathy so understood tends to focus on the process in which our idea of the other person's state of mind is converted into the corresponding impression and the role played in this by the impression of self. As I intend to show, however, there are important questions about the way in which the idea itself is supposed to be acquired, and how this is to be reconciled with Hume's philosophical position both in the Treatise and elsewhere. In other words, the focus of the following discussion is the initial stage in the process which is supposed to result in our sharing the mental states of others. I believe we shall find that this—the epistemological—aspect of sympathy provides an important parallel to Hume's earlier treatment of the understanding. Tony Pitson is at the Department of Philosophy, University of Stirling, Stirling, FK9 4LA, Scotland. Email: aepl@forth.stirling.ac.uk 256 Antony E. Pitson Other Selves: The Epistemological Problem The topic of other selves is usually approached in philosophy from the perspective of both epistemology and the philosophy of mind. The epistemological issue is one concerning our knowledge of other selves. More precisely, what is at stake is the nature, extent and basis of such knowledge. Discussion of this issue often focuses on the question of whether we can, strictly speaking, be said to have knowledge of other selves at all. The reason why this question should have become the focus of discussion is one which deserves treatment in its own right. But it appears to arise from an underlying view of the nature of the self, viz., Descartes' dualism. The separation between mind and body involved in this doctrine leads naturally to the question as to whether the other beings by whom I am surrounded are anything more than just bodies. Is it not consistent with what I can observe that these other beings should be no more than machines?1 Do I therefore have any reason for supposing that I am not the sole worldly possessor of a mind? When we consider Hume's position in the light of this familiar way of regarding the issue of other selves, there is one striking fact which emerges immediately. This is that Hume appears to entertain no doubt whatsoever about our capacity for gaining awareness of the mental states of others—and, indeed, never directly addresses the issue of scepticism in this context. (Nor, we might note, does he hesitate to ascribe mental states to non-human animals—as, for example, in Treatise I iii 16). The existence of others as the subjects of mental states is presupposed both in Hume's discussion of the understanding in Book I of the Treatise, and also in his discussion of the passions—in particular, the indirect passions—in Book II. His account of sympathy, as we shall see, is one which in effect attempts to explain how it is possible for us to be aware of the contents of other people's minds. Since he nevertheless accepts some form of dualism (though not, as his discussion in Treatise I...