Sympathy, Simulation, and the Impartial Spectator

Abstract

Hume observed that our minds are mirrors to one another: they reflect one another's passions, sentiments, and opinions.' This "sympathy," or "propensity we have to sympathize with others, to ... receive by communication [the] inclinations and sentiments [of others], however different from, or even contrary to, our own," he held to be the chief source of moral distinctions.2 Hume presented an account of how this mirroring of minds works. After a brief presentation of the account, I will show how it needs to be updated and corrected in the light of recent empirical research. Then I will give some reasons to think that the mirroring of minds is more pervasive than even Hume had thought: that mirroring is an essential part of the way in which we think about other minds. Finally, I will make some remarks about the relevance of mirroring to ethics.