Abstract

Wittgenstein has anticipated important recent developments in the philosophy of psychology in psychology and in cognitive science itself. Mis rejection of epistemic intermediaries makes him a precursor of Gibsonian theory. His model of concept formation has important links with contemporary work on categorisation and stereotypes.

Highlights

  • I shall argue that Wittgenstein is the precursor of two views that are gaining in importance in philosophy: he rejected epistemic interediarics and he anticipated the actual development in the area of perceptual categorisation

  • I shall try to show how these issues may be connected. Their connection leads to a sophisticated externalist model in category interpretation

  • It is not hard to see that this point in my explanation of the Wittgensteinian model fits well with his view that conceptual boundaries may not be considered loo rigorously. In this way, the model of realising a program in a field becomes a practical answer to the negative remarks Wittgenstein made about epistemic intermediaries and against the classical view of concepts

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Summary

WITTGENSTEIN ON EPISTEMIC INTERMEDIARIES

I mean such things as sense dala, repre­ sentations, percepts and contents. It is further supposed that, in order to bridge this gap, one should introduce something that is inserted between the individual and environ­ mental items he is interested in Epistemic intermediaries, such as those mentioned above, would be very useful in accomplishing this task. He was convinced that there was no private language, and that exactly because of this, it was wrong to start explanations on the basis of a particular individual’s mind, including such things as epistemic intermediaries He further thought that the supposition of epistemic intermediaries is misguided by the very fact of being the result of the previously introduced gap separating the individual from his experience of the external world. This can be done by epistemological tools, such as epistemic intermediaries

WITTGENSTEIN ON BUNDLES OF PROPERTIES
REALISATION OF A PROGRAM IN A FIELD
SLIGHT DEVIATIONS
SOPHISTICATED EXTERNALISM
ANTIREALISM IN CATEGORY INTERPRETATION
VIII. WITTGENSTEIN’S REALISM
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