Abstract
Abstract More than three decades have passed since the United States and the USSR opened negotiations to limit strategic arms. The process has produced an Interim Agreement and six treaties: ABM, SALT II, INF, CFE, START I, and START II. At first glance, this appears to be an arms control triumph. A closer look, however, finds a near total disconnect between expectations and realities throughout the U.S.‐USSR strategic arms control process, As demonstrated in this article, factors external to the arms control process resulted in real progress in arms reduction. These factors include: Soviet fears of U.S./NATO military advantages; the Soviet decision to raise their military burden in a vain attempt to satisfy the demands of nuclear war fighting objectives; the economic and political consequences of that perennial disaster known as socialized agriculture; and the political “dry rot” of the entire Soviet empire.
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