Doctrine and deterrence

Abstract

H ave Soviet political and military leaders adopted strategic deterrence and arms control concepts compatible with those of their American counterparts? The Soviet view of strategy differs considerably from the American one in several important respects. Soviet military doctrine and military art (including strategy, operational art, and tactics) are based on both ideological and pragmatic traditions. Marxism-Leninism creates an ideological imperative which provides that history must continue to flow in certain, preferred directions, and that flow cannot be circumvented by technology. This longterm perspective admits of many short-run fluctuations in actual behavior. Of particular importance to Soviet planners is the "correlation of forces," which refers to a combination of social, economic, political, and military factors influencing the decision to go to war. Soviet leaders seek to avoid nuclear war with the same degree of seriousness that their military professionals are required to prepare for it. That the Soviets are serious about avoiding nuclear war, and pessimistic about what would happen if they could not, makes their interest in deterrence a matter of national self-interest. Western Sovietologists have noted that there is no exact Russian equivalent of deterrence, but I am asserting here that the Soviets understand what we mean by it. While they do not fully accept American formulations of deterrence theory and concepts, they have figured out where the bottom line is, and it is not unacceptable to them. A standoff in the military correlation of forces is preferable to Western superiority, with which the USSR has lived in the past. Arms control agreements that codify strategic parity provide confirmation that the USSR has reached coequal superpower status with the United States and represent commitments of the Soviet leadership which are judged binding upon their successors, other things being equal. Thus, United States efforts to redefine the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) regime as the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks" (START), to deploy intermediate-range ballistic and cruise missiles in Europe, and to launch the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) will be.interpreted by the USSR in terms of whether they contribute to, or detract from, their previously attained and acknowledged status. We can expect that, to the extent that the United States is perceived to be shifting the correlation of forces against Soviet interests in a significant way, the USSR will react with counterbalancing mechanisms. Having once attained the sweet smell of parity, the USSR is unlikely to give it up voluntarily. Whether the Soviet Union seeks military superiority is a much debated issue in the West. If the correlation of forces is taken on a global basis instead of being seen strictly as a United States-Soviet relationship, it is difficult to see that superiority is within their grasp, however much of their national product they commit to it. Although the Kremlin's position is not judged an enviable one, it is not one to be disparaged. Soviet geopolitical reach is assured by its expansive borders and secure interior lines, compared to the long distances its adversaries must travel to confront it at probable points of tension. Soviet military power is regarded as a prudent hedge against the failure of deterrence and. in the absence of war, as a useful coercive instrument. The United States and NATO can expect to continue to face Soviet pressures aimed at dividing the alliance politically. Soviet long-range objectives include, as they have declared, continuation of the class struggle primarily through indirect means. Nuclear war is not part of this scenario, unless Soviet rulers fail badly. Unlike the implausible expectations about war outcomes which took national leaders into World War I, today neither Soviet nor American officials could have many delusions about the risks to their societies and governments from nuclear war. A balance of terror may not be as appealing as a millennium, but it is the clear conviction of the USSSR, based on their behavior, that it has worked.