Abstract

Loss of coolant in the operation of any nuclear power plant will eventually become the primary source of hazard in the sequence of events leading to reactor core uncovery. Subsequent failure in removing the nuclear decay heat and preventing the core uncovery will further lead to loss of coolant accident (LOCA). In conjunction to this safety concern, it is crucial that the reliability of the plant emergency core cooling system is systematically and critically analysed. This article presents a case study on the time dependent reliability analysis for a safety injection system (SIS) of an advanced pressurized water reactor, based on the failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA) and fault tree (FT) analysis approach. The identified generic data for component reliability are carefully reviewed and used in this study. Based on the base case model, sensitivity and importance measure analysis for basic events are performed and the outcomes gained are presented and discussed. From the analysis, it is shown that the safety injection pumps of the SIS contribute significantly to the reliability of the system. In the short (at 0.5 hour) and long (7.0 hours and 72.0 hours) run, safety injection pumps are critical and influence the reliability of the SIS the most. The SIS’s FT logic model that has been developed and calculated shows the usability of the FMEA and FT approach that are implemented in analysing SIS time dependent reliability.

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