The self-entrapment of rationality in dealing with North Korea

Abstract

Abstract Although South Korea and the democratic countries in the region have tried hard to solve the problems of North Korea for over 55 years, since the end of the Korean War, most approaches in the past seem to have failed. So, it is very necessary to reexamine their approaches toward North Korea before repeating more mistakes in the future. North Korean policymakers probably are not as rational as most people assume. North Korea's total failure as a state proves that they have accumulated more irrational decisions than rational ones in their management of the country. They failed to choose the best courses of action to achieve their goals. They probably do not have sufficient information, abundant and active flow of information, or freedom of action for rational decisions. Therefore, the policymakers in democratic countries should be cautious not to entrap themselves by assuming that North Korean counterparts also are applying the rational model to decisions. This could be reinforced by two cases—an analysis of the North Korean motives for the axe murder incident at Panmunjeom in 1976 and North Korea's announcement of the so-called nuclear test in 2006. There is no better way for policymakers in democratic countries than to take more fact-oriented approaches toward their analyses and predictions about a probably irrational North Korea.