Abstract
in September 1688, they fully expected to impose peace on the Germans within a matter of months. Their hopes rested upon the conviction that the Emperor Leopold, beset by a war with the Turks in Hungary and administrative and financial chaos within his Austrian lands, was too weak to fight in the West-whether or not the Turks continued the war in Hungary. Lacking firm leadership from the emperor, Louis was convinced that the dismal prospects of successful resistance to France would quickly bring out the rivalries and distrust which permeated German politics. Once this happened, the German princes would be ready for peace on Louis' terms.' French predictions of Leopold's military weakness proved disastrously wrong as the first year of war clearly demonstrated, and consequently so did their expectations of German disunity and impotence. Nonetheless, Louis' military predictions were the product of the best and most extensive intelligence apparatus in Europe. In the years following the Truce of Ratisbonne in 1684, French agents had provided
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