Abstract

The 872-day siege of Leningrad is one of the largest life-and-death struggles in history. No city in modern times has suffered greater loss of life over a comparable period of time. According to recent estimates, close to two million Soviet citizens died within the city or defending it from the outside between 1941 and 1944. The civilian death toll within Leningrad was about one million. When most of those deaths occurred, during the first year of the Soviet-German War, Leningrad was strategically important for the USSR. Had Germany taken the city in the latter half of 1941, it could have linked up with Finland, consolidated its position on the Baltic, and directed additional hundreds of thousands of troops to the offensive against Moscow. In turn, had Germany then quickly seized Moscow (and perhaps Stalin), Soviet resistance might have ended.' For historians of the Soviet Union, Leningrad's first year of war represents an important period for gauging the extent to which the general population supported the Communist state following years of state-directed mass terror, which had left an indelible mark on Leningrad. Expressions of support for the system, or protests against it, assumed a much greater significance in the first year of the war than at any time during the 1930s. With German Army Group North camped less than three miles south of Leningrad, the city's defense was very much in doubt. The prevailing uncertainty compelled supporters of the party-state to rally to its defense, and, likewise, gave opponents with pent-up grievances their best chance since the Civil War to overthrow the government, though all realized that political revolution would lead almost automatically to enemy occupation of Leningrad.

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