Strategic Uncertainty and Missile Defence: Revisiting the 1999 National Intelligence Estimate

Abstract

Strategic uncertainty remains a significant challenge for defence planners and national leaders responsible for developing and acquiring future military capabilities. Concerns in the United States over missile proliferation during the 1990s were embodied in the 1999 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), which predicted the emergence of a long-range ballistic missile threat by 2015. Comparing the NIEs predictions with the actual evolution of the threat reveals not only an overly pessimistic evaluation but also politicization of the intelligence assessment. At the time of its release, the report added to a growing sense of vulnerability and further encouraged policy-makers to make suboptimal missile defence acquisition decisions. In particular, the worst-case scenario thinking exemplified by the 1999 NIE contributed to an unnecessarily rushed testing programme, the premature deployment of homeland missile defence and an oversized system in Europe. Although missile defence may have strategic value, the rush to deploy has resulted in a costly and less effective military capability due to unfounded fears of strategic surprise and entrenched notions of the ballistic missile threat. Strategic uncertainty will always be a challenge, but focusing solely on developing capabilities with less regard to the actual threat environment is a recipe for costly and ineffective weapons systems.