Simple Sentences, Substitution, and Intuitions * By JENNIFER SAUL

Abstract

Philosophers of language have long recognized that in opaque contexts, such as those involving propositional attitude reports, substitution of co-referring names may not preserve truth value. For example, the name ‘Clark Kent’ cannot be substituted for ‘Superman’ in a context like: 1. Lois believes that Superman can fly without a change in truth value. In an earlier paper (Saul 1997), Jennifer Saul demonstrated that substitution failure could also occur in ‘simple sentences’ where none of the ordinary opacity-producing conditions existed, such as: 2. Superman leaps more tall buildings than Clark Kent does. Accounts focusing on opacity were unable to explain our ‘anti-substitution intuitions’ in such cases. In Simple Sentences, Substitution, and Intuitions, Saul extends her earlier work. She provides a comprehensive presentation and criticism of recent accounts of simple sentence substitution failure, and proposes a new approach drawing on psychological evidence about cognitive processing. Saul's purpose is not merely to solve the substitution puzzle cases, but to make a significant methodological point about the use of intuitions in philosophy of language.