Abstract

Abstract Vladimir Krstić (2023) argues that some putative counterexamples to the definition of lying in terms of an intention to deceive are not genuine counterexamples. He suggests that the agents in these cases have an ‘oblique intention’ to deceive. I argue that Krstić is incorrect about both these cases and the very notion of oblique intention.

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