Abstract

Abstract According to an epistemically optimistic view of empathy – understood as the simulation of another person’s state – agents learn (1) in which state the target is and (2) what it is like for her to be in this state. Assuming the necessity of justification for knowledge, this view faces the challenge of how imagination can justify beliefs. Constraining simulation to match the target’s state seems to be a solution. Because of the abundance of plausible psychological reactions towards a specific situation, however, we need to know how the target reacts in order to simulate the correct mental state. According to narrativists, we gain this knowledge by means of testimony, which makes simulation superfluous. For those who accept that (2) has epistemic value, the paper presents a solution to the problem of justification that assigns a central role to both testimony and imagination.

Full Text

Published Version

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call

Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.