Schiffer on modes of presentation

Abstract

Any attempt to explain intentional behaviour will face the problem of modes of presentation. What one does depends on what one thinks and desires. If Lois likes Clark Kent and believes that Clark Kent cannot fly, she would plead with him not to jump off a tall building. Though Lois also likes Superman, she would not plead with Superman not to jump off a tall building; but, of course, Clark Kent is Superman. So Lois must be thinking about the same individual under different modes of presentation. The way we think of modes is as syntactic items in the language of thought. These syntactic items, given a context, relate a believer to a proposition believed. One and the same proposition could be accepted and rejected without the believer being aware of this. Given this account of modes, there is a neat explanation of Lois's behaviour with regard to Clark Kent/Superman, which appeals neither to senses nor narrow content.' Any difference in Lois's behaviour will be explained as due to differences of syntactic items in her belief box2 (as it were). When Lois pleads with Clark Kent not to jump she does so because she believes the proposition (Clark Kent, non-flier), and she believes this because the syntactic string 'Clark Kent cannot fly' enters her belief box. When Lois does not plead with Superman not to jump, it is because she believes the proposition (Clark Kent, flier), and she believes this because the syntactic string 'Superman can fly' enters her belief box. In a number of recent writings3 Schiffer has proposed a roadblock to this neat explanation. Modes must relate believers to the same proposition in different ways. Schiffer attacks modes of presentation by saying that there exists nothing that is adequate to play this role. So there is nothing that