Recognition and Redistribution: Finding Common Ground between Two Conceptions of Freedom

Abstract

Today, critical theory is marked by a conflict between two competing theories; these theories are recognition based theories of freedom and theories that equate justice with the notion of just distribution. The recognition paradigm argues that there are sources of oppression and exploitation that have less to do with material differences, and more to do with how people relate to each other in a social context, or even the attitudes that institutions can adopt towards certain groups of people (Cordelli, 2015, p.679; Honneth, 2012, pp.37-38; Schemmel, 2012, p.123; Young, 1999, p.417). Honneth's recognition theory, for example, advocates for the subordination of distributive justice to recognition concerns, making it a 'dependent variable in relations of recognition' and treating intersubjectivity as the primary means for promoting freedom (Honneth, 2012, p.46). That is, maldistribution ought to be considered a symptom of misrecognition or disrespect rather than being a primary cause for social injustice. This approach, however, is criticized as being an overly simplistic and one-sided account of morality that reduces justice claims to feelings of recognition and disrespect (Fraser, 2001; Lazzeri, 2009; Thompson, 2006; McNay, 2008; Zambrana, 2013, Zurn, 2005). For example, Fraser (Fraser and Honneth, 2003, pp.22-37) argues that a politics of recognition, centering on the concern of self-realization, is a reductive account of social justice that wrongfully equates morality to cultural concerns and psychological harm.Honneth (2014) attempts to shore up his theory by explicating how moral norms, and freedom itself, are embedded within and dependent upon social relations through a reconstruction of Hegel's three social spheres of action: relationships, markets, and the state. However, Honneth's theory of recognition still remains vague in terms of outlining a satisfying approach for dealing with the issue of distributive justice. Even if we accept that Honneth has successfully made the case that a theory of recognition is necessary for understanding social demands for distributive politics and their normative justification, it is still not sufficient in terms of dealing with a variety of distributive justice claims. As we will see, Zurn (2005) demonstrates that this deficiency in Honneth's theory is not easily remedied due to complications in Honneth's attempt to classify distributive justice claims as ultimately being recognition claims. However, if we are convinced of the necessity of a theory of recognition to explain and justify redistributive politics, then what is needed for a more complete theory of freedom is an account of distributive justice that at the same time embodies and addresses recognition needs. I propose, as one possible solution to this problem, supplementing Honneth's theory of recognition with an account of distributive justice that simultaneously addresses the recognition requirements for ethical life and freedom. The two supplements that I propose are drawn from Nussbaum's capability approach and Pettit's theory of non-domination. My aim in this article is to demonstrate how combining these two approaches is one example of how specific policies for distributive justice can be closely imbricated, even mutually reinforcing, with Honneth's border criteria of justification through mutually recognized social norms.1First, it will be argued that while Nussbaum's capabilities approach is decidedly a program for political action, it is not only sensitive to the diversity of conceptions of the good life held by individuals, but emphasizes the dignity and respect for individuals, and the importance of individual self-realization in underwriting free choice. It will also be shown that increasing opportunities for intersubjective recognition is necessary for the development of what Nussbaum calls her list of central capabilities, the capabilities a person needs in order to be counted free.2 The highlighting of various institutional provisions for the promotion of people's capacity to make meaningful political choices, what Nussbaum refers to as a positive conception of liberty, offers a distributive program of justice that can also address recognition needs identified by Honneth. …