Problem Kantova rješenja faktičnosti i univerzalnosti vrijednosti

Abstract

The author proceeds from the assumption that the empiric tenet cannot be carried out unless it has resulted from a universalization based upon not only the customs themselves but upon moral judgment as well. Kant's model of the moral judgment appears somewhat vague insofar as it disregards social implications. Teleological presumptions covering the period from the Old Greece times up to the Middle Ages do not differentiate "what is" from "what ought to be". Such a clash was introduced by Descartes's quantification of fact as well as by his rationalization of value. In what follows moral discovery has been approached relying upon the so-called naturalistic fallacy objection as well as upon Kant's unification of fact and value. The closing passage of the article deals with the deistic aspect of Kant's philosophy of religion which supports moral religion and ethical/civil society. Kant's critique of some aspects of the Church in terms of its institutional structure is also discussed as well as his defense of man as moral being.