PreSCAN: A Comprehensive Review of Pre-Silicon Physical Side-Channel Vulnerability Assessment Methodologies

Abstract

Physical side-channel attacks utilize power, electromagnetic (EM), or timing signatures from cryptographic implementations during operation to retrieve sensitive information from security-critical devices. This paper provides a comprehensive review of these potent attacks against cryptographic hardware implementations, with a particular emphasis on pre-silicon leakage assessment methodologies. We explore the intricacies of cryptographic algorithms, various side-channel attacks, and the latest mitigation techniques. Although leakage assessment techniques are widely adopted in the post-silicon phase, pre-silicon leakage assessment is an emerging field that addresses the inherent limitations of its post-silicon counterpart. We scrutinize established post-silicon techniques and provide a detailed comparative analysis of pre-silicon leakage assessment across different abstraction levels in the hardware design and verification flow. Furthermore, we categorize and discuss existing pre-silicon power and electromagnetic modeling techniques for leakage detection and mitigation that can be integrated with electronic design automation (EDA) tools to automate security assessments. Lastly, we offer insights into the future trajectory of physical side-channel leakage assessment techniques in the pre-silicon stages, highlighting the need for further research and development in this critical area of cybersecurity.