Abstract

Abstract The Republic of Korea (ROK) today faces the greatest security threat since the Korean War half a century ago. The military situation on the Korean peninsula has been remarkably aggravated following North Korea's nuclear test, and the agreement on deactivation of the Combined Forces Command (CFC) has jolted the roots of the ROK-U.S. combined defense posture. While the ROK and the United States were putting many endeavors into disabling the existing combined defense system, North Korea scored a series of nuclear and missile provocation during the past couple of years. Meanwhile, the Bush administration showed a major turn-around in its attitude toward North Korea since its nuclear test. Washington, which previously labeled North Korea as part of an “axis of evil,” now considers the North a legitimate counterpart for negotiating peace and security on the Korean peninsula. The Roh administration also goes with the principle of “peace for peace” or “no war” on the Korean peninsula. “Improving inter-Korean relations” constitutes the most salient concept to direct all other aspects of its security policy. In this paper the author examines the political and military implications of three key challenging issues pressuring South Korean security-namely, wartime OPCON transfer, a nuclear-armed North Korea, and President Bush's proposal to end the Korean War. The author also presents his own views for sustaining the ROK-U.S. combined defense posture in the upcoming post-CFC era.

Full Text
Published version (Free)

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call