Perspectives on Fighting Nuclear War

Abstract

There is so much that is sane and sensible in Michael Howard's article, Fighting a Nuclear War, that I believe a brief public dialogue may be fruitful. This is not one of those all too frequent occasions when representatives of radically opposed schools of thought attack cardboard figures and talk past each other. I cannot do justice to the richness of Professor Howard's article in the space of a letter, but I do hope to suggest that he and some, at least, of the more war-fighting minded strategists, are not that far apart. Since I was identified several times in the article as an advocate of policies of which Professor Howard (and the late Bernard Brodie) disapproves, I must assume that my views have some representative character. First, I would like to identify some important common ground. I agree with Professor Howard (and Bernard Brodie) that: nuclear war would be so terrible as virtually to warrant description as an obscenity; a policy of firm containment of the Soviet Union is necessary; credible (as opposed to incredible) threats should be posed; war, if it must be waged, must be waged only for clear political objectives that are in balance with the military means applied; a policy of strategic (inter alia) nuclear deterrence is a regrettable necessity; and, finally, that the Soviet system is manifesting many very serious internal weaknesses and vulnerabilities. On all of that we can agree. Where I find Professor Howard's (and Bernard Brodie's) analysis to be deficient is that it appears to stop when the buttons are pushed. At the very point where we need strategic thinking most, no recommendations are discernible. Of course it is preferable to deter war rather than to wage it; that is not at issue. But what is the connection between prospective prowess in the conduct of war and preor early intra-war deterrent effect? Furthermore, what should we do if war occurs? Perhaps an East-West war can be deterred, or prevented by policies aimed at political stabilization, indefinitely. But what if it cannot be so deterred? What advice would Professor Howard proffer to American SIOP planners?