British nuclear deterrence in the 21st century

Abstract

This chapter examines the engagement between government and the public over deterrence between the deployment of Trident in 1995 and the 2021 Integrated Review. It suggests that several technical factors influence system choices and decisions, and form most of the public discourse. Engagement on ethical elements; the issue of why Britain needs a nuclear deterrent; and the moral implications of nuclear deterrence and nuclear war (the two are not synonymous) has been avoided by successive governments. Ethical elements are always considered, agonised over, privately and in camera, but not in public nor on the record. To consider the nature of current British and NATO nuclear deterrence theory and strategy clarifies the difference between 1980 – when NATO nuclear deterrence entailed being prepared to fight and win a nuclear war – and 2021 – when NATO nuclear deterrence entails being prepared to use nuclear weapons to deter war – and what that means strategically and ethically. This chapter addresses how nuclear deterrence really works, despite anodyne technical language. No-one considers nuclear war a moral good, but debate should be about deterrence, not war. At present, much public discourse equates nuclear deterrence to nuclear war, and debate often starts from this misunderstanding.