Abstract

On Feb 27, 2022, Russia's President Vladimir Putin ordered Russian nuclear forces to be placed on “the special regime of combat duty”.1BBCBBC Ukraine invasion: Putin puts Russia's nuclear forces on “special alert”.https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-60547473Date: Feb 28, 2022Date accessed: March 1, 2022Google Scholar This decision increased the alert status of Russian nuclear forces from a peacetime status to a pre-combat status, creating the legal conditions for any further instruction to launch missiles. Presumably Putin's move is intended to create fear and uncertainty, intensify pressure on Ukraine and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies and partners, reduce resistance to Russian attacks in Ukraine, and extract concessions in negotiations. But these threats represent an absolutely unacceptable escalation of his invasion of Ukraine. The threat of nuclear weapons ratchets up tensions and increases the anxiety and stress that every soldier, resistance fighter, civilian, and politician is experiencing. This threat is also likely to affect analysis and decision making by all parties to the conflict in regard to the potentially far-reaching impacts of decisions. Indeed, history has shown us the risks that these types of situations can pose. Since the 1960s the assumption by nuclear armed states was that the prospect of mutually assured destruction would guarantee that nuclear weapons are never used. Nuclear war was believed to be so catastrophic that no leader would ever dare use their nuclear arsenals. More recently, in January, 2022, all the nuclear weapons states that are signatories to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (China, France, Russia, the USA, and the UK) reiterated the Reagan–Gorbachev statement that “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought”.2The White HouseReference Joint Statement of the Leaders of the Five Nuclear-Weapon States on Preventing Nuclear War and Avoiding Arms Races.https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/01/03/p5-statement-on-preventing-nuclear-war-and-avoiding-arms-races/#:~:text=We%20affirm%20that%20a%20nuclear,deter%20aggression%2C%20and%20prevent%20warDate: Jan 3, 2022Date accessed: March 2, 2022Google Scholar Nonetheless, documentary research and testimonies have revealed occasions during the decades after the Cuban missile crisis when nuclear weapons were very nearly used as a result of misperceptions and misinterpretation of signals.3Plokhy S Nuclear folly: a new history of the Cuban missile crisis. Allen Lane, London2021Google Scholar In 1983, for example, the NATO Able Archer military exercise increased the fear level in the Soviet Union to such an extent that Russian nuclear forces were mobilised.4Lewis P Williams H Pelopidas Aghlani S Too close for comfort cases of near nuclear use and options for policy. Chatham House Report.https://www.chathamhouse.org/2014/04/too-close-comfort-cases-near-nuclear-use-and-options-policyDate: April, 2014Date accessed: March 1, 2022Google Scholar Also in 1983, satellite signals that appeared to be incoming nuclear missiles from the USA to the Soviet Union nearly led to a launch-on-warning response from Moscow. The decision not to do so rested largely on the decisions of one individual, lieutenant colonel Stanislav Petrov.5Schlosser E Command and control; nuclear weapons, the Damascus accident, and the illusion of safety. Penguin Books, London2014Google Scholar Even after the end of the Cold War, when tensions were low, a Norwegian rocket was initially feared to be an incoming nuclear weapons attack in Russia.5Schlosser E Command and control; nuclear weapons, the Damascus accident, and the illusion of safety. Penguin Books, London2014Google Scholar In the case of nuclear weapons, such mistakes, if they lead to inadvertent use, can never be small or put right. Any use of so-called tactical nuclear weapons (in the low kiloton range) in battle situations would also risk rapid escalation to large-scale nuclear war. The overwhelming humanitarian catastrophic impact of a nuclear weapon is too great to allow these weapons into stressful conflict situations in which such mistakes will occur. Humanity has not avoided nuclear war thus far because of wise leaders, sound military doctrine, or infallible technology. As former US Defense Secretary Robert McNamara observed: “We lucked out. It was luck that prevented nuclear war.”6Goodman E Echoes of McNamara and ‘Nam. The Washington Post, Jan 31, 2004https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/2004/01/31/echoes-of-mcnamara-and-nam/321bdeba-488e-4bd5-abb9-ea2c9d7ff058/Date accessed: March 1, 2022Google Scholar An estimated 200 000 people died within 5 months of the nuclear bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan, in 1945 and many survivors suffered long-term effects, including increased risk of leukaemia, other types of cancer, and effects on mental health.7Tomonaga M The atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki: a summary of the human consequences, 1945–2018, and lessons for Homo sapiens to end the nuclear weapon age.J Peace Nuclear Disarmament. 2019; 2: 491-517Google Scholar The world's nuclear armed states currently have a combined arsenal of around 12 700 nuclear weapons.8Federation of American ScientistsStatus of world nuclear forces.https://fas.org/issues/nuclear-weapons/status-world-nuclear-forces/Date: 2022Date accessed: March 1, 2022Google Scholar According to the Federation of American Scientists, the USA deploys 1644 and Russia deploys 1588 strategic warheads on bombers and missiles,8Federation of American ScientistsStatus of world nuclear forces.https://fas.org/issues/nuclear-weapons/status-world-nuclear-forces/Date: 2022Date accessed: March 1, 2022Google Scholar many with an explosive power of 100 kilotons or more. Both countries are modernising their nuclear delivery systems. If a single warhead of 100 kilotons exploded over a major city it would kill hundreds of thousands of people outright and injure many more, overwhelming the health-care system of an entire nation.9International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear WeaponsNo place to hide: nuclear weapons and the collapse of health care systems.https://www.icanw.org/report_no_place_to_hide_nuclear_weapons_and_the_collapse_of_health_care_systemsDate: 2022Date accessed: March 1, 2022Google Scholar Even a small-scale nuclear war, involving 250 of the deployed nuclear weapons in the NATO and Russian arsenals, or as might take place between India and Pakistan, would be expected to result in sufficient dust and smoke blocking solar radiation to cause major climate disruption that would trigger a global famine, putting billions of people at risk and destroying modern civilisation.10Toon OB Robock A Turco RP Bardeen C Oman L Stenchikov GL Nuclear war: consequences of regional-scale nuclear conflicts.Science. 2007; 315: 1224-1225Google Scholar, 11Helfand I Nuclear famine 2 billion people at risk? International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War.https://www.ippnw.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/2013-Nuclear-Famine.pdfDate: 2013Date accessed: March 1, 2022Google Scholar A large-scale nuclear war would create a nuclear winter, with temperatures falling an average of about 10°C across the globe, and could kill most of humanity over 10 years.12Robock A Oman L Stenchikov GL Nuclear winter revisited with a modern climate model and current nuclear arsenals: still catastrophic consequences.J Geophys Res. 2007; 112D13107Google Scholar The threat by Putin has exposed the weakness of the belief system in nuclear deterrence. Such an approach can never be risk free and the consequences of failure of this strategy are catastrophic. This realisation should lead to more nations signing and ratifying the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), which currently has 86 signatories and 59 states parties,13International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear WeaponsBanning nuclear weapons, signature and ratification.https://www.icanw.org/signature_and_ratification_status#:~:text=The%20Treaty%20on%20the%20Prohibition,signatories%20and%2059%20states%20partiesDate: 2022Date accessed: March 1, 2022Google Scholar but that will take time, even with political will. In the near term, it is essential that leaders refrain from exacerbating tensions by implying that such weapons have a military purpose and that immediate steps are taken to reduce the risks of miscommunication and error potentially leading to tragedy on a vast scale. NATO and Russia must explicitly renounce any use of nuclear weapons in the conflict in Ukraine. They must join with the other nuclear armed states, at the earliest possible moment, in support of the aims of the TPNW, to commence negotiations for the complete, verifiable elimination of all nuclear weapons. IH is a member of the Board of International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War and the International Steering Group of the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons. PL reports grants from MacArthur Foundation, Carnegie Corporation of New York, and the Ploughshares Fund. AH is a member of Medact, the UK affiliate of International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War.

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