The Theoretical Foundations of Strategic Nuclear Deterrence

Abstract

In the continuing debate about strategic issues, the vocabulary and theoretical concepts of strategic nuclear deterrence theory are now widely used to support inconsistent conclusions. Will deploying the MX missile enhance strategic nuclear deterrence or make it more difficult? Does the existence of mutually invulnerable strategic forces reduce the likelihood of major war, or does the strategic stalemate make conventional or limited nuclear war more likely? To the extent that contradictory conclusions are claimed to follow from a theory of strategic nuclear deterrence, these inconsistencies suggest a fundamental weakness in the theory or that those using the theory do not fully appreciate it and its limits. In either case, a reconsideration of the theoretical foundations of strategic nuclear deterrence may help to elucidate this debate. I shall examine these foundations by asking the most basic questions of nuclear deterrence theory. What, precisely, is being threatened in a nuclear threat? Are there different types of nuclear threats? If so, do they rest on different sets of assumptions or do they work in different ways? Nuclear threats seem closely related to escalation, but are there different types of escalatory processes? If so, in what ways do they differ? These are fundamental questions about the foundations of strategic nuclear deterrence theory. This analysis will attempt to answer these questions by describing two types of strategic nuclear threats. In the first type, a state raises the risk of an uncontrolled, explosive escalation to general nuclear war by engaging in what Thomas