Brinkmanship and Nuclear Deterrence: The Neutrality of Escalation

Abstract

The defense of the United States and the defense of Europe ultimately rely on a threat to use nuclear weapons if all else fails. This type of deterrence cannot be based on a cold rational calculation that nuclear retaliation for any attack is assured. Nuclear war is irrational; it would destroy that which we are trying to save. To threaten nuclear war, therefore, is equally irrational. Nuclear deterrence becomes credible only when there exists the possibility for any conventional conflict to escalate out of control. The threat is not a certainty but rather a probability of mutual destruction. Nuclear deterrence involves a fundamental trade-off. There is a value in being able to make the threat of mutual destruction. The nuclear age has been forty years without world war, But, there is the cost of leaving our fate to chance. Nuclear deterrence requires accepting the risk of mutual destruction. Much of the current debate about nuclear deterrence centers on this risk. What can we do to lower the probability of nuclear war without losing the value of deterrence?