NATO Nuclear Deterrence: The Warsaw Summit and Beyond

Abstract

IntroductionNATO, for its part, has consciously and conspicuously de-emphasized nuclear weapons in its defense policy and posture since the end of the Cold War. As a consequence, the Alliance now lacks the policies and capabilities needed to deter, and if necessary to respond to, a limited Russian nuclear strike.- Dr. Matthew Kroenig, 2015, US Senate testimony 1With NATO's Warsaw Summit of July 2016 comes the next opportunity to initiate a much-needed review of the Alliance's nuclear policy. The end of the Cold War saw the Alliance shift its emphasis from collective defense and deterrence to crisis management operations, as witnessed most clearly in the Balkans and Afghanistan. In the process, many argue has neglected traditional nuclear deterrence since the fall of the Berlin Wall over twenty-five years ago.2 However, in 2014, everything changed. After illegal annexation of Crimea, and active support of separatists in Eastern Ukraine, stated, Russia's aggressive actions against Ukraine have fundamentally challenged our vision of a Europe whole, free, and at peace. 3 The Syrian Civil War (and associated European refugee crisis), the attacks by the Islamic State (IS) in Paris, Istanbul and Brussels and the Turkish downing of a Russian fighter are all events that have forced to address security challenges both to its east and to its south, challenges posed both by state as well as non-state agents. These mean that is spread thin at a time when Russia continues to rattle its nuclear saber with increasing volume. While recent reforms dominate the headlines in the run-up to the Warsaw Summit, the credibility of NATO's nuclear deterrence remains in question in the face of developing threats. This begs the question: what does need to do at the Warsaw Summit to clarify and reinforce its nuclear deterrence posture?NATO should consider making the following six changes to its nuclear deterrence posture to ensure that it will both offer a credible deterrent to twentyfirst century adversaries and maintain cohesion among its members. These six changes fall under the umbrella of NATO's three Cs required for effective deterrence: Capability, Credibility and Communication.4 The six recommendations include:* Adding aircraft (DCA) and nuclear strike missions in Poland and Turkey* Incorporating the Heavy Airlift Wing C-17s into the Prime Nuclear Airlift Force* Maintaining the status quo in terms of B-61 locations and quantities* Increasing nuclear readiness (response times) at aircraft bases* Creating a NATO Strategic Deterrence Fund* Drafting a nuclear declaratory statement.Recent Nuclear HistoryUnlike the United States and NATO, Russia has placed an increased emphasis on nuclear weapons in its national security planning since the end of the Cold War.- Matthew KroenigIn 1954, the Alliance's first nuclear weapons were stationed in Europe, a move that was unanimously welcomed by NATO.5 At that time, the initial purpose of these weapons was to counter the overwhelming conventional advantage the Soviet Union had over the Alliance. Since then, the quantities and types of nuclear weapons in Europe have changed dramatically. However, the US B-61 gravity bomb, designed to be dropped by dual-capable fighter/bomber aircraft, has remained the only American nuclear weapon in Europe since 1991.6Despite lobbying attempts by certain Allies who wish to withdraw the B-61 from Europe, this controversial tactical nuclear weapon has kept its place on the continent thanks to NATO's 2012 Deterrence and Defense Posture Review (DDPR).7 Ulrich Kahn explains why the lobbying did not work: They [the lobbying efforts] have failed, mostly due to the concerns of NATO's easternmost allies who attach a highly symbolic/political value to the only American nuclear weapons currently stationed in Europe. …