PERCEPTION OF EPISTEMIC AUTHORITY AND RELIANCE ON IT AMONG EMPLOYEES OF DIFFERENT GENERATIONS TOWARDS THEIR DIRECT MANAGERS IN GREEK ORGANIZATION “X”

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An international organization in Greece employs at least three generations—X, Y, and Z. Understanding the factors that influence the perception and reliance on epistemic authority across these generations is essential. Such insights would enable organizational leaders to address and accommodate these differences, thereby enhancing the level of perception and reliance on direct supervisors' epistemic authority. This could positively impact various outcomes, including job performance, employee turnover, achievement of key performance indicators (KPIs), employee integration and engagement, and other organizational objectives.Epistemic authority is studied as one of the most significant forms of authority, with the assumption that people are more likely to trust and agree with someone they perceive as knowledgeable or an expert in a given field—i.e., an epistemic authority. When a person's authority is based solely on their official position, it fosters less reliance than when they are regarded as an expert in their field. This perception as an expert enhances the sense of authority and fosters greater trust in it. The primary aim of this study is to investigate the perception of and reliance on the epistemic authority of direct supervisors from different generations, to promote positive collaboration between management and employees. The study results reflect that, overall, the employees at organization “X” perceive direct supervisors as positive epistemic authorities. Statistically significant differences were found in the perception of and trust in epistemic authority among employees from generations X, Y, and Z. The most important reasons for relying on epistemic authority, as claimed by respondents, include the supervisor’s “personality traits,” “opinions,” and “expertise” in the relevant field. The factors most strongly influencing the perception of epistemic authority were “expertise” and “subjective compassion.”