“Conspiracy theory”: The case for being critically receptive

Practical recommendations to communicate with patients about health‐related conspiracy theories

Humans seem drawn to dark conspiracy theories, often in favor of the simple truth In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, misinformation and conspiracy theorizing have surged President Trump, for example, praised the antimalarial drug hydroxychloroquine as a "game changer" despite scant empirical evidence of its efficacy and safety for the treatment of SARS-CoV-2 Others in the administration have promoted the unsubstantiated theory that SARS-CoV-2 originated in a Chinese lab, despite scientific consensus that the virus likely originated in an animal source before zoonotic transfer and that no evidence indicates that the virus emerged through deliberate lab manipulation of a related virus Here, Friedman discusses why humans are vulnerable to conspiracy theories

Editorial—The truth is out there: The psychology of conspiracy theories and how to counter them

Conspiracy Theories, Mistrust Take Root During Pandemic

Theoretical typology of deceptive content (Conspiracy Theories)

Conspiracy theories often emerge during public health crises, and can provide some explanation for the causes behind the crises. However, the prevalence of conspiracy theories also poses a serious threat to public health order and hinders the implementation of disease prevention and control measures. No studies have examined the role of multiple risk perceptions in the formation of beliefs in conspiracy theories from a cognitive perspective in the context of the epidemic. In this cross-sectional study, participants filled in an online survey in order to investigate the relationship between epidemic severity and beliefs in conspiracy theories and the mediating role of risk perception in this relationship. The results showed that COVID-19 epidemic severity positively predicted beliefs in both in- and out-group conspiracy theories. Risk perception mediated the positive relationship between COVID-19 epidemic severity and belief in in-group conspiracy theories. These results suggest that in a major public health crisis event: (1) residents at the epicenter may be more prone to believing in both in- and out-group conspiracy theories; and (2) beliefs in in- and out-group conspiracy theories may have different psychological mechanisms. Therefore, conspiracy theories about public health incidents, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, should be classified and treated by policy stakeholders.

While conspiracy theories are treated as irrational fringe beliefs in popular culture, conspiracy belief is quite common. Given the disconnect between stereotypes about conspiracy belief and its prevalence, I tested whether people have difficulty recognizing the conspiracy theories that they believe as conspiracy theories. Across two studies I demonstrate that people have considerable difficulty identifying conspiracy theories they believe as conspiracy theories, particularly when they do not take much time to consider whether their beliefs might be conspiracy theories. This is consistent with the notion that people experience "conspiracy blindness." People have trouble recognizing the conspiracy theories they believe as conspiracy theories because they do not take the time to consider whether their beliefs might be conspiracy theories. In Study 2, I demonstrate that people can overcome their conspiracy blindness and recognize the conspiracy theories they believe as conspiracy theories when they are given a definition for "conspiracy theory" and asked to consider their answer. This suggests that people are typically ignorant of their own conspiracy beliefs, but capable of recognizing them when given the tools and motivation to do so. However, recognizing their beliefs as conspiracy theories does not reduce their adherence to those beliefs.

Creating Conspiracy Beliefs: How Our Thoughts Are Shaped

This paper aims to provide clear guidelines for researchers studying conspiracy theory belief. It examines the meta-linguistic question about how we should conceptaulize 'conspiracy theory' and its relationship to the evaluative question of how we should evaluate beliefs in conspiracy theories, addressing normative issues surrounding the meaning, use, and conceptualization of ‘conspiracy theory’, as well as how these issues might impact how researchers study conspiracy theories or beliefs in them It argues that four norms, the Empirical Accuracy Norm, the Linguistic Norm, the Social Norm, and the Academic Fecundity Norm, underlie debates about how we should conceptualize or define ‘conspiracy theory’. We zoom in on the linguistic norm, as it has been treated as more fundamental than the other norms. We then scrutinize the argument that normative conceptualizations prematurely settle the question of how conspiracy theories and belief in them should be evaluated, and argue that it fails. Subsequently, we turn to the risks normative conceptualizations pose when it comes to certain assumptions and biases in the study of conspiracy theory belief. Finally, we explore where this leaves us regarding the meta-linguistic and evaluative questions, and formulate seven guidelines for studying conspiracy theory belief, whether it be theoretical, historical, or empirical.

Conspiracy theories tend to be prevalent, particularly in societies with high economic inequality. However, few studies have examined the relationship between economic inequality and belief in conspiracy theories. We propose that economic inequality leads people to believe conspiracy theories about economically advantaged groups (i.e., upwards conspiracy theories) and that moral evaluations of those groups mediate this relationship. Study 1 (N = 300) found support for these ideas in a survey among Chinese residents. Study 2 (N = 160) manipulated participants' perceptions of economic inequality in a virtual society. The manipulation shaped moral evaluations of economically advantaged groups, and conspiracy beliefs, in the predicted manner. In Study 3 (N = 191) and Study 4 (N = 210), we experimentally manipulated participants' perceptions of economic inequality in real Chinese society and replicated the results of Study 2. In addition, in Study 4, we find that economic inequality predicts belief in conspiracy theories about economically disadvantaged groups (i.e., downward conspiracy theories), which was mediated by anomie. We conclude that perceived economic inequality predicts conspiracy theories about economically advantaged groups and that moral evaluations account for this effect. Also, upward and downward conspiracy theory beliefs are associated with different psychological processes.

Watchman on the Tower: Ezra Taft Benson and the Making of the Mormon Right

A substantial minority of the public express belief in conspiracy theories. A robust phenomenon in this area is that people who believe one conspiracy theory are more likely to believe in others. But the reason for this "positive manifold" of belief in conspiracy theories is unclear. One possibility is that a single underlying latent factor (e.g. "conspiracism") causes variation in belief in specific conspiracy theories. Another possibility is that beliefs in various conspiracy theories support one another in a mutually reinforcing network of beliefs (the "monological belief system" theory). While the monological theory has been influential in the literature, the fact that it can be operationalised as a statistical network model has not previously been recognised. In this study, we therefore tested both the unidimensional factor model and a network model. Participants were 1553 American adults recruited via Prolific. Belief in conspiracies was measured using an adapted version of the Belief in Conspiracy Theories Inventory. The fit of the two competing models was evaluated both by using van Bork et al.'s (Psychometrika, 83, 2018, 443, Multivariate Behavioral Research, 56, 2019, 175) method for testing network versus unidimensional factor models, as well as by evaluating goodness of fit to the sample covariance matrix. In both cases, evaluation of fit according to our pre-registered inferential criteria favoured the network model.

Conspiracy theories are not fringe ideas, tucked away in society’s dark corners. Conspiracy theories are everywhere, and like other ideas they have consequences. When people believe conspiracy theories they may act on them. In democracies, conspiracy theories can drive majorities to make horrible decisions. Conspiracy beliefs can conversely encourage political abstention: if one believes the system is rigged, they will be less willing to take part. Conspiracy theories form the basis of some people’s medical decisions. For a select few, conspiracy theories are instructions to fight fire with fire, to use violence. There is no time in recorded history without conspiracy theories. Whether we are examining accounts of ancient Rome, medieval Europe, or twentieth-century America, conspiracy theories have inspired millions to take action. Scares, panics, purges, and bloodshed have sometimes been the result. Conspiracy theorizing is an enduring part of politics. Despite this, researchers and journalists continually struggle to understand the phenomenon. Why do people believe conspiracy theories? What are their effects on politics and society? How do conspiracy theories differ across the world? What should be done about conspiracy theories? Are we currently living through the conspiracy theory renaissance?

Researchers have theorized about how belief in conspiracy theories can negatively affect interpersonal relationships. However, despite growing anecdotal evidence of the effects that conspiracy theories seem to have on people's relationships, a systematic assessment of these effects is lacking. In seven studies (six of them preregistered, N = 2526), we examined whether people's perceptions of others' conspiracy beliefs were negatively associated with their actual (or anticipated) relationship satisfaction with those others. We found that participants' perceptions of their social contacts' beliefs in general (Pilot Studies 1–2) and specific conspiracy theories (Study 1) were negatively associated with their relationship satisfaction with those contacts. Using a hypothetical scenario, we further observed that participants anticipated that their relationship satisfaction would worsen when one of these social contacts explicitly endorsed (vs. opposed) a conspiracy theory (Studies 2, 3a, and 3b). Finally, participants expected lower relationship satisfaction with a stranger who endorsed (vs. opposed) a conspiracy theory in their online dating profile (Study 4). Importantly, across all studies we observed that participants' own conspiracy beliefs moderated the association between others' conspiracy beliefs and relationship satisfaction, revealing a similarity–dissimilarity pattern: although the association was negative among participants with weaker conspiracy beliefs, we observed signals of reversal among participants with stronger conspiracy beliefs. Our findings further suggest that a process of attitudinal distancing (among other relational changes) could explain why perceived conspiracy beliefs negatively predicted relationship satisfaction. Taken together, this research provides evidence that conspiracy beliefs have the potential to harm interpersonal relationships.

People who strongly endorse conspiracy theories often proclaim to be rational skeptics and “critical freethinkers” who “just ask questions.” Indeed, many well-known conspiracy theories—such as 9/11-for-truth theories, but also flat earth conspiracy theories—are based on a range of seemingly articulate and well-crafted arguments. Do conspiracy theories originate from rational skepticism, or rather from gullibility? In this chapter I review the evidence, which reveals that (a) conspiracy beliefs correlate positively with various implausible beliefs, including paranormal belief, superstition, belief in pseudoscience, and “bullshit” receptivity; (b) conspiracy beliefs predict increased susceptibility to a range of cognitive biases, including the conjunction fallacy, illusory pattern perception, over-detecting agency, and anthropomorphism; (c) belief in conspiracy theories predicts increased stereotyping; and (d) belief in conspiracy theories is rooted in System 1 instead of System 2 thinking, as reflected in findings that belief in simple solutions for societal problems, intuitive thinking, negative emotions, and decreased analytic thinking, all predict conspiracy beliefs. Taken together, the evidence does not support a model in which rational skepticism forms the psychological basis of conspiracy theories. Instead, conspiracy theories appear to originate from gullibility, and true rational skepticism most often prompts disbelief in conspiracy theories.