One China and Relations Across the Taiwan Strait

Abstract

Key Points Relations between China and have reached an impasse. Former President Lee Teng-hui's statement on state-to-state in 1999 triggered the latest round of cross-strait recriminations. Beijing's reply came just before Taiwan's presidential election, in a white paper entitled, One China Principle and the Issue. It announced that China was prepared to use force against if negotiations on unification are indefinitely postponed. Both sides would like to find a way out of their respective corners. Taipei can go no further in asserting its separate identity without risking military action by China. New President Chen Shui-bian announced that he would push forth the inclusion of the so-called 'state-to-state' description in the [Republic of China's] Constitution. At the same time, as evidenced by Chen's election, Beijing's reliance on the threat of force to influence events is waning. It seems prepared to wait for some further positive steps from Chen that would allay continuing suspicions of his commitment to independence. This post-election period presents Beijing and Taipei with an opportunity to defuse a potentially explosive situation. They are carefully seeking openings to reduce the level of tension between them and to redirect relations away from confrontation and within the context of a measured assessment of their respective strategic interests. The United States policy of strategic ambiguity encourages these tendencies and should therefore be adhered to rigorously. ********** Relations across the Strait have reached an apparent impasse. Both China and have, in a sense, painted themselves into corners. Yet, aware of the considerable costs that will inevitably be incurred by new and higher levels of tension or conflict, both President Jiang Zemin of China and Chen Shui-bian, the newly elected President of Taiwan, share a vital interest in finding a facesaving way out of their respective dilemmas without compromising their longer term objectives. In the process, each is being influenced and constrained by a number of factors related to politics, economics, and broad strategic interests. Overall, these factors will provide incentives to seek a reduction of tensions, at least in the short term. At the same time, years of mutual mistrust and the stark and growing differences between their respective political and social cultures will continue to affect the prospects for a mutually acceptable resolution of the issues separating China and Taiwan. The Taipei Corner continues to hold the initiative in relations across the Strait, the terms of which have been largely defined by former President Lee Teng-hui. His highly visible political visit to the United States in 1995, his pragmatic diplomacy to develop a network of unofficial relations around the world, and his assertion in 1999 that and the Mainland exemplify a special relationship between two sovereign states all convinced Beijing that was following a course leading toward independence. Current President Chen Shui-bian's stance on relations reflects the views of his Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), pro-independence lineage as well as the influence of Lee Tenghui, who in effect articulated a politically authoritative definition of Taiwan identity. Chen inherited Lee's position, and the requirements of democratic politics in and the aspirations of his political base make it impossible for him to repudiate it. By doing so, he would not have been elected and, if he did now, he is unlikely to be reelected. In sum, although mention of the Special Two State Theory is likely to appear less frequently in Taipei's political lexicon, the assumptions inherent in the formulation will continue to inform thinking about relations with the Mainland. Chen is also a relatively weak president, having been elected with only 39 percent of the electoral vote. …