Abstract

"On Virtue Ethics" (Rosalind Hursthouse)

Highlights

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  • Traditional virtue ethics characteristically treats a range of topics which seldom, if ever, form the central concerns of various versions of deontology and utilitarianism

  • The extent to which virtue ethics forms a distinctive category of ethical theory is complicated, by the fact that deontologists and utilitarians continue to make revisions to their theories which take into account standard objections made on behalf of virtue ethics, and because there is more than one version of virtue ethics

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Summary

University of Western Ontario

Traditional virtue ethics characteristically treats a range of topics which seldom, if ever, form the central concerns of various versions of deontology and utilitarianism. Where Aristotle provides us with one brand of virtue ethics, Nietzsche gives us another, and the differences between them can be as significant as the difference between any one of them and some particular deontological or utilitarian theory Such complications should serve as warning shots across the bow of any attempt to give a short and quick answer to the question “What is virtue ethics?” What is needed instead is a detailed concrete working out of a particular version of a virtue ethic. We can see how it differs from or is similar to a particular version of deontology or utilitarianism It is with these matters in mind that Rosalind Hursthouse in her new book, On Virtue Ethics, explores a particular virtue based ethical theory; a theory which she describes as neo-Aristotelian. Her approach has its roots in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, but deserves the “neo,” because it does not share Aristotle’s views about slavery and women, and because the standard list of virtues includes items not found in Aristotle’s list (e.g., charity and benevolence.) contemporary ethical theory needs to consider issues about which Aristotle had little or nothing to say (e.g., can an Aristotelian ethical naturalism survive sceptical criticisms of it?) In what follows I want to consider certain aspects of Hursthouse’s neo-Aristotelianism, especially as they bear upon our conception of moral education

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