Abstract
The successful decoding of human genome and subsequent advances in new life sciences innovation create technological presuppositions of a new possibility of justice i.e. the just distribution of both social (income, wealth, etc.) and natural (rationality, intelligence, etc.) goods. Although Rawlsians attempt to expand their theory to include this new possibility, they fail to provide plausible metrics of social justice in the genomics and post-genomics era. By contrast, Senians seem to succeed to do so through their index of basic capabilities. This paper explores what might be regarded as a Senian perspective of distributive justice in new life sciences innovation. The argument is that, by comparing freedoms (different functionings) instead of primary goods, the capability theory allows not only for the identification of injustices linked to natural lottery but also for their elimination through the use of new genomic technologies, including gene-based diagnostics, gene therapy, somatic cell engineering (SCE) and germ-line engineering (GLE). These innovative technologies seem to have the potential to reduce variability in natural goods and therefore enable individuals to convert social goods into well-being or welfare.
Highlights
Recent advances in new life sciences innovation, including new diagnostic tools and genetic interventions (Propp & Moors 2009), challenge the traditional idea of justice according to which morally arbitrary natural inequalities are given facts that remain outside the domain of justice
This paper is structured as follows: firstly we discuss the failure of Rawlsians to provide plausible metrics of social justice in the genomics and post-genomics era; secondly, we examine the advantages and disadvantages of a Senian perspective of distributive justice in new life sciences innovation; we conclude that Sen’s theory, properly interpreted, is likely to succeed in providing plausible metrics of justice in the new technological era through an index of basic capabilities
A senian perspective of distributive justice in New life sciences innovation If it is true that Rawlsians such as Farrelly fail to provide plausible metrics of justice in the genomics and post-genomics era, is it true that Senians such as Cooke (2003) and Fox (2007) succeed to provide better metrics through the capabilities approach? If the answer is yes what might be regarded as a Senian perspective of distributive justice in the era of new life science innovation?
Summary
Recent advances in new life sciences innovation, including new diagnostic tools and genetic interventions (Propp & Moors 2009), challenge the traditional idea of justice according to which morally arbitrary natural inequalities are given facts that remain outside the domain of justice. According to (Fox 2007) the first principle of the Senian perspective is the following: 1) Natural primary goods are to be distributed so as to (contribute the heredity bases of crucial human functioning that) bring individual off-spring up above a decent minimum of internal basic capability deprivation. In order to go beyond sufficientarianism, he introduces a second principle: 2) Natural primary goods are to be distributed (so as to contribute the heredity base of crucial human functioning that is) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged This second principle is prioritarian and supposedly deals with the problem of inequality of capabilities of individuals above the decent genetic minimum. Redistribution of income, gene therapy or GLE might be crucial for enabling some people to function as equal citizens
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