Abstract

The article deals with the problem of TEMPEST - unintentional radiation of electronic equipment, which can be intercepted by malefactors in the form of radiation of an electromagnetic parasitic wave, and which, from a security point of view, is compromising radiation because they can have compromising information. Today, the term TEMPEST is the name of a technology that includes various methods of analyzing electromagnetic compromising radiation in such a way that they can be used to recover intercepted data. The task was completed: It is known that electronic equipment creates electromagnetic fields that can interfere with radio and television reception at a considerable distance. But interference is not the only problem caused by stray electromagnetic radiation. In some cases, you can get information about the signals that are used inside the equipment, when the radiation signals are intercepted by intruders and these signals are decoded. This capability poses a problem, especially in the case of digital equipment, since remote signal recovery within the equipment can allow the reconstruction of the data that the equipment is processing. Therefore, the problem arises of determining technologies for detecting spurious electromagnetic radiation from electronic computers, which may have compromising information. The content of TEMPEST-technology is considered as a physical phenomenon of capturing and recovery of electromagnetic radiation emitted by digital equipment, and which can have compromising information. TEMPEST hardware analysis is performed, which includes various types of sensitive receivers that can monitor a wide range of frequencies, as well as a combination of hardware and software capable of processing the received signals. The analysis of various types of TEMPEST-technology is carried out, namely: Tempest-attack, Soft TEMPEST, as well as a variety of technologies for intercepting information by receiving spurious radiation of a monitor signal, searching for the necessary information on a disk, outputting information to an unused serial port; reflections of the luminous flux from the monitor screen on the walls; modeling the luminous flux in LED indicators and others. Recommendations for protection against TEMPEST technologies for companies and individuals are given.

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