Abstract
ZusammenfassungIn this article, I defend a version of moral constitutivism that is based on a theory of goods. It is inspired by ancient philosophy both in claiming that action theory should be formulated in teleological terms (not as a causalism) and in the idea that a sound theory of goods should be a eudaemonist one. Additionally I argue that morality can be understood on the basis of such an approach.
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