Abstract
NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen has become a surprisingly strong advocate of missile-defence cooperation with Moscow, making it a core element of his programme to improve NATO–Russia relations. Nonetheless, the recurring obstacles that have long impeded extensive NATO–Russian BMD cooperation largely persist, making it unlikely the parties can realise Rasmussen's ambitious goals. Pursuing them risks generating yet another round of mutual recriminations resulting from frustrated expectations. It would be more profitable to focus on harmonising threat assessments, pursuing shared early-warning capabilities, strengthening barriers against accidental or unauthorised missile launches, and collaborating more to curtail ballistic-missile proliferation. Joint BMD projects cannot be used to create a political consensus on missile defense when it does not already exist.
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