Not Home Alone

Abstract

Deputy Director, Centre for Defence and Security Studies, University of Manitoba. This article is drawn from previously published works on Canada and ballistic missile defence and is part of a much large research project that compares Canadian policy on ABM, SDI, and NMD.THE SIMPLE AND STRAIGHTFORWARD ANSWER to the question of Canadian participation in national missile defence (NMD) is in. The more difficult policy issue for Canada is the means or optics through which Canada will express its willingness to participate and the implications of being in relative to other issues concerning Canadian defence policy. An expression of Canadian support, which would open the door to participation, will likely follow two important decisions. First, the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) will shift their position to that of at least benign acceptance of United States missile defence plans. Preferably, NATO will come around to supporting a limited United States missile system for North America after the administration of George W. Bush merges national and theatre missile defence (TMD) programmes into a single global effort and offers it to allies, friends, clients, and potentially Russia and perhaps China. Second, Russia will agree, at a minimum, to revise the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty to permit such a system, and/or agree to some form of interim agreed position pending a significant restructuring of the arms control regime for strategic weapons in which offensive and defensive systems are merged into a single package. Ideally for Canadian policy-makers, agreed revisions or a new arms control package will be accompanied by signs of direct co-operation between the United States and Russia on missile defence that builds on the current United States-Russian Joint Early Warning Programme and the article in the NATO-Russia Charter on missile defence co-operation. Although the issue of China will likely remain problematic, it will not be a major stumbling block to Canadian participation.Of these two decisions, the NATO factor is likely the key to Canadian support. Cold war history indicates Canada's preference for a situation in which its support of, and participation in, United States defence and foreign policy initiatives can be embedded within the alliance. The current government, like most of its predecessors, prefers not to be seen as home alone with the United States, not least because of fears of domestic political ramifications (many times unfounded, especially today) and the uncontested belief that Canadian internationalism and multilateralism are about obtaining counterweights to United States bilateral dominance.However, Canadian reluctance to get out ahead of the allies is also a function of unspoken concerns about the potential costs of a premature decision to support and participate. Notwithstanding the domestic public fear, such a decision could lead the United States to seek a substantial Canadian contribution beyond simply assigning the command and control/battle management (C[Symbol Not Transcribed]/BM) to North American Aerospace Defence (NORAD).(1) For example, in the absence of Danish agreement to modernize the Thule, Greenland, Ballistic Missile Early Warning (BMEW) radar for a more optimal missile defence function, the deployment of a BMEW radar in Canada's northeast arctic would be ideal. In fact, one could see such a request as a way to sidestep the Danes, not least because of their current reluctance to modernize. Other radars in central-northern Canada could enhance the effectiveness of the system by providing additional tracking and damage assessment prior to the release of a second, third, or more interceptor. Under NORAD arrangements, the cost of such facilities would likely be under the traditional capital funding formula - 60 per cent United States and 40 per cent Canada. However, under the current budget stress in the Department of National Defence (DND) and its proposed capital funding programme, either certain capital programmes would have to be delayed significantly, if not cancelled, or the government would have to provide additional funding, which it would be highly reluctant to do, especially for missile defence. …