Has Moral Responsibility Rested on a Mistake?

Abstract

Is moral responsibility the same in all contexts? Is it acceptable for our practices of holding responsible to ignore the reality of trauma, inequality, and oppression? Hundreds of philosophers, drawing on P. F. Strawson’s 1962 essay, “Freedom and Resentment,” have argued for accounts of moral responsibility that would, at least implicitly, answer these questions in the affirmative. Yet these affirmative answers are not, I shall argue, Strawson’s view. Strawson argues for a real-world approach to moral responsibility, a facet of his work that should be acknowledged. That facet should also be extended, using insights from feminist philosophers, philosophers of race, and social and political philosophers. The reinterpretation of Strawson I discuss here makes better sense of moral responsibility, and also supports the improvement of our practices in assigning moral responsibility. We can’t understand the nature and limits of our moral demands—demands on ourselves and others—while ignoring the actual conditions in which those demands are deployed.