Group or Conference Rate-Making and National Transportation Policy in the United States

Abstract

Common carriers by rail, road, water, and air in United States generally determine their rates, fares, classification ratings, and other charges and regulations by group consideration of these matters. Such rate-making conferences, bureaus, associations, or committees have had a long history among rail and ocean common carriers which predates their regulation by federal government; but regulation is claimed to have stimulated, if not actually required, such group action on part of newer modes of transport and to have provided additional justification for cooperative action on part of older agencies.l Whether earliest conferences were designed to avoid cut-throat competition or for monopolistic exploitation need not concern us here. A contemporary valuation must be made in context of current performance and institutions. The controversy regarding group rate-making has been heated, and, as one writer observed, the discussion of these differences is not carried on in a friendly atmosphere of academic debate.2 The caloric nature of dispute may be explained by fact that there is a great deal at stake in terms of both money and basic politicoeconomic philosophy. As in case of martinis, tastes in political economy differ markedly; and whereas some prefer (at least for others) stimulation of straight competition with only a dash, if any, of regulation, others prefer more regulation (especially if they can regulate themselves, or be regulated by those sympathetic to them, or are convinced that alternatives would be disastrous). The declaration of national transportation policy contained in Transportation Act of I9403 does not settle controversy, but in conjunction with balance of Act suggests, at least to this writer, that Congress favors a pragmatic rather than doctrinaire approach to problem of competition and monopoly in industry.4