Representational Practices at the International Criminal Court: The Gap between Juridified and Abstract Victimhood

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Acknowledgement The author would like to thank Hugh Dyer and David Galbreath for their helpful comments. Notes Sam Zia-Zarifi, ‘Who's Afraid of International Relations?’ Leiden Journal of International Law, Vol.13 (2000), pp.1015–24. Ibid. Tam Dalyell, ‘Blair, the War Criminal,’ The Guardian, 27 March 2003; see also Richard Tyler, ‘Greek Lawyers to Sue Blair for War Crimes’, World Socialist Web Site, 2 June 2003, found at www.wsws.org See Yoram Dinstein, ‘The Distinction between War Crimes and Crimes against Peace’, Israel Yearbook on Human Rights, Vol.24 (1995), pp.1–17. Of course, the unilateral resort to force does not necessarily qualify as aggression. A state may claim that a unilateral act is lawful under customary international law, for instance in the case of humanitarian intervention, or to uphold prior resolutions adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter. In adopting the latter argument the UK government followed a similar line of argument to that used to justify NATO action in Kosovo in March 1999. See Constantine Antonopoulos, ‘Whatever Happened to Crimes Against Peace?’ Journal of Conflict and Security Law,Vol.6 (2001), pp.33–62. ‘Treaty of Peace with Germany’, American Journal of International Law, Vol.13 (1919), p.250; see also ‘International Military Tribunal Judgement and Sentences’, American Journal of International Law, Vol.41 (1947), pp.172–332. See Broomhall, (under review) pp.46–7; Sadat (under review) pp.132–8. Sadat (under review), pp.132–3. G. Gaja, ‘The Long Journey towards Repressing Aggression’, in Cassese et al. (under review), p.428; see also A. Cassese, ‘From Nuremberg to Rome: International Military Tribunals to the International Criminal Court, in Cassese et al. (under review), p.10, fn.23. Dalyall, ‘Blair the War Criminal’ (note 3). Sadat, p.xiii. The ICC assumed non-retrospective jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes on 1 July 2002. This was following the 60th ratification of the Rome Treaty earlier that year. The Rome Statute reaffirms the illegality of aggression in principle but specifies in Article 5 that the Court may not exercise jurisdiction until the Assembly of State Parties is able to define it and not within seven years of the Statute entering into force. This political compromise allowed some commentators to claim that the Court exercises ‘dormant jurisdiction’ over the crime of aggression. Kirsch and Robinson, ‘Reaching Agreement at the Rome Conference’, in Cassese et al. (under review), p.78. Marc Weller echoes Sadat in calling the Rome Conference ‘a constitutional moment’. He writes, for instance that the Conference ‘exercised the function of an international constitutional convention’. See ‘Undoing the global constitution: UN Security Council action on the International Criminal Court’, International Affairs Vol.78 (2002), pp.693–712. With the definition of a state's right of self-defence expanding following the use of force after September 11th it is likely that a consensus on aggression is even further away. On the right to self-defence see M. Byers, ‘Terror and the Future of International Law’ in K. Booth and T. Dunne (eds.), Worlds in Collision: Terror and the Future of Global Order (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002), pp.118–27. Sadat (under review), p.9. Sadat, (under review), pp.8–9. See also L.N. Sadat and S.R. Carden, ‘The New International Criminal Court: An Uneasy Revolution’, The Georgetown Law Journal, Vol.38 (2000), pp.381–474. K. Sengupta, ‘Guilty of War Crimes – or Victim of a Feud with US Soldiers?’ The Independent, 22 May 2003; Richard Norton-Taylor, ‘Soldier Arrested over Iraqi Torture Photos’ The Guardian, 31 May 2003. M. Cherif Bassiouni and Edward M. Wise, Aut Dedere Aut Judicare: The Duty to extradite or prosecute in international law (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1995) Broomhall (under review), p.4. On this use of Grotian solidarism see F. Mégrét, ‘Epilogue to an Endless Debate: The International Criminal Court's Third Party Jurisdiction and the Looming Revolution of International Law’, European Journal of International Law, Vol.12 (2001), pp.247–68; see also Bassiouni and Wise (note 16), pp.22–42. Broomhall (under review), p.105. Ibid., p.59. Ibid., p.106. See also William Schabas, ‘National Courts Finally Begin to Prosecute Genocide, the “Crime of Crimes” ’, Journal of International Criminal Justice, Vol.1 (2003), pp.39–63. Broomhall (under review), p.109. Ibid., p.112. See also Holmes, ‘National Courts versus the ICC’ in Cassese et al. (under review), pp.667–8. Antonio Cassese, ‘From Nuremburg to Rome: International Military Tribunals to the International Criminal Court’, in Cassese et al. (under review), p.18. See Sadat, pp.21–46; Broomhall, pp.71–6. Cassese (note 24), p.15. Ibid., p.16. James Crawford, ‘The Work of the International Law Commission’ in Cassese et al. (under review), pp.23–34; see also Adriann Bos, ‘From the International Law Commission to the Rome Conference (1994–1998)’, In Cassese et al. (under review), pp.35–65. Sadat (under review), pp.11–12. See P. Kirsch QC and D. Robinson, ‘Reaching Agreement at the Rome Conference’, in Cassese et al. (under review), pp.67–91. Ibid., p.88. W.R. Pace and J. Schense, ‘The Role of Non-Governmental Organization’, in Cassese et al. (under review), pp.105–43. Ibid., p.137. Sadat (under review), p.5. Broomhall (under review), p.5. Mégrét (note 18), p.258. Sadat (under review), p.103. Mégrét (note 18), p.258. For a commentary on the origins of complimentarity and the relevant Articles of the Statute see John T. Holmes, ‘Complimentarity: National Courts versus the ICC’, in Cassese et al. (under review), pp.667–86. Rome Statute, Article 17, accessed at http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/romefra.htm. J. Ralph, ‘Between Cosmopolitan and American Democracy: Understanding American Opposition to the International Criminal Court’, International Relations Vol.17 (2003), pp.195–212. The term ‘new sovereigntist’ is Peter J. Spiro's. See his ‘The New Sovereigntists: American Exceptionalism and Its False Prophets’, Foreign Affairs, Vol.79 (2000), pp.9–15. In May 2002 the Bush administration ‘unsigned’ the Rome Treaty. In a public statement explaining US policy, Under Secretary of State Marc Grossman stated that the US remained ‘committed to promoting the rule of law and helping to bring violators of humanitarian law to justice, wherever the violations may occur.’ Remarks to the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Washington, DC, 6 May 2002, accessed at http://www.state.gov/p/9949.htm. The US government opposes the Rome Statute, however, because it has delegated jurisdiction to an unaccountable court. In other words the US does not necessarily oppose universal jurisdiction for core crimes, but it has insisted that such jurisdiction can only be enforced by national courts. This position can be found in D.J. Scheffer, ‘Staying the Course with the International Criminal Court’, Cornell International Law Journal, Vol.35 (2002), pp.47–100. See also R. Wedgewood, ‘The International Criminal Court: An American View’, European Journal of International Law, Vol.10 (1999), pp.93–107. The subject is addressed in the Cassese volume by Hans-Peter Kaul who was Deputy Head and Head of the German Delegation to the Rome Conference and Preparatory Committee respectively. He argues that ‘the idea of universal jurisdiction entitles states to do collectively what they have the power to do individually’. States ‘may confer this individual power on a judicial entity they have established and sustain together and which acts on their behalf.’ He argues that the principle of universal jurisdiction for the core crimes is well established in customary international law. ‘Consequently, States have a legitimate and acknowledged legal basis to use, if they so wish, the universality approach with regard to core crimes, either in their national criminal jurisdiction or when establishing together a new and complimentary international criminal justice system as during the UN negotiation for the ICC.’ Hans-Peter Kaul, ‘Preconditions to the Exercise of Jurisdiction’, in Cassese et al. (under review), p.591. America's pressure on Belgium to repeal legislation providing for universal jurisdiction suggests that the US statement supporting universal jurisdiction enforced at the level of the state is merely a rhetorical strategy to disguise a policy that puts American national interests ahead of the universal interest. See C.S. Smith, ‘Rumsfeld says Belgian law could prompt alliance to leave’, International Herald Tribune, 13 June 2003’, and ‘Belgians are incensed by American pressure on war crimes law’, International Herald Tribune, 14 June 2003. Broomhall (under review), p.93. See also Jan K. Kleffner, ‘The Impact of Complimentarity on National Implementation of Substantive International Criminal Law’, Journal of International Criminal Justice, Vol.1 (2003), pp.86–113. Darryl Robinson, ‘The Rome Statute and its Impact on National law’, in Cassese et al. (under review), pp.1849–50. Luis Moreno Ocampo, an Argentinian lawyer who helped bring the leaders of his country's former military dictatorship to justice was elected as Prosecutor in March 2003. For detailed commentary on these procedures see Olivier Fourmy, ‘Powers of the Pre-Trial Chambers’ in Cassese et al. (under review), pp.1207–30. P. Kirsch, QC and D. Robinson, ‘Initiation of Proceedings by the Prosecutor’, in Cassese et al. (under review), p.662. For similar arguments see Fernandez de Gurmandi, S.A., ‘The Role of the International Prosecutor’, in Roy Lee (ed.), The International Criminal Court: The Making of the Rome Statute – Issues, Negotiations, Results (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1999), pp.175–88. See Ralph, ‘Between American and Cosmopolitan Democracy’ (note 41). Grossman, ‘American Foreign Policy and the International Criminal Court’ (note 42). For this see Ralph, ‘Between American and Cosmopolitan Democracy’ (note 41). See also David P. Forsythe (2002) ‘The United States and International Criminal Justice’, Human Rights Quarterly, Vol.24, pp.974–91. Broomhall (under review), p.68. At the time of writing 90 of the 139 signatories had ratified the Rome Treaty. Sadat notes that opponents of the idea of an independent Prosecutor included not only the US, but also the Russian Federation, China, France, Israel, India, Malaysia, Egypt and Syria. The UK, she notes, was initially undecided. Its decision to join the Like-Minded Groups was a pivotal moment in the history of the negotiations. Sadat (under review), p.94. Rome Statute, Article 16 (note 40). D.J. Scheffer, ‘The United States and the International Criminal Court’, American Journal of International Law, Vol.93 (1999), p.18. Kaul (note 42), p.600. Rome Statute, Article 12 (note 40). Not only did the US vote against the Treaty at the Rome Conference, it has since pursued a strategy to exclude American citizens from the Court's jurisdiction. On the use of Article 16 to negotiate exemptions for UN personnel see C. Stahn, ‘The Ambiguities of Security Council Resolution 1422’, European Journal of International Law, Vol.14 (2003), pp.85–104; on the use of Article 98 to negotiate bilateral agreements promising US citizens immunity from ICC jurisdiction, see S. Zappalà, ‘The Reaction of the US to the Entry into Force of the ICC Statute: Comments on UN SC Resolution 1422 (2002) and Article 98 Agreements', Journal of International Criminal Justice, Vol.1 (2003), pp.114–34. Kaul (note 42), p.607. Sadat (under review), p.118. Ibid., p.106; see also E. Wilmshurst, ‘Jurisdiction of the Court’, in Lee (note 48), pp.127–42. Sadat (under review), pp.120–21. Rome Statute, Article 72 (note 40). H.J. Behrens, ‘Protection of National Security Information in the ICC: A Guide to Article 72 of the Rome Statute’, in Roggemann and S˘arccˇevicˇ (under review) pp.116–17. Rome Statute Article 72 (note 40). W. Schabas, ‘National Security Interests and the Rights of the Accused’, in Roggemann and [Sbreve]arcčevič (under review), p.113. Rome Statute, Article 66 (note 40). Schabas (note 65), p.109.

THE POWER OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL TO REFER COUNTRY situations to the International Criminal Court (ICC) has been hailed, particularly among international human rights activists, as a chance to expand the reach of international criminal justice by offering the opportunity to hold accountable perpetrators of atrocities who might otherwise be exempt from prosecution and punishment. The historic referral of the situation in Darfur in March 2003 was widely welcomed as an important step in the fight against impunity as was the Security Council's later, and more controversial, referral of Libya in February 2011. In principle the expansion of the reach of accountability is something to be welcomed, but it is important to recognize the costs of this expansion as well as the danger that they may outweigh the intended benefits. When the ICC was established in 1998, it was heralded as a significant step forward for international justice, a permanent court that would aid in the fight against impunity for genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and eventually aggression, and that would expand the reach of international justice beyond the hybrid and ad hoc mechanisms that had been established in the preceding years. To date, 122 states have become parties to the Rome Statute, accepting the ICC's jurisdiction over humanity's worst crimes, albeit in a form that is complementary or secondary to the jurisdiction of national courts. The Rome Statute includes a number of provisions that are particularly celebrated in the human rights community, not least Article 13(b) that grants the Security Council the power to refer country situations to the court, thereby placing even nonsignatory states under the court's jurisdiction in cases where the Council, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, finds a threat to international peace and security. This, in a sense, simply confirms the powers previously exercised by the Council when it created the ad hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda, among others. But referrals to the ICC engage a whole new set of issues. Along with the referral power, the Security Council was also granted powers to defer an ICC investigation or prosecution for a renewable period of twelve months under Article 16. Unsurprisingly, this provision has been far more contentious among those seeking to advance the legal protection of human rights, and international criminal justice as a whole, with many viewing it as providing an unwelcome opportunity for political interference in a judicial body as well as reducing the scope for accountability. So far, the Security Council has referred only two cases to the ICC--those of Darfur in 2005 and Libya in 2011--and has not yet exercised its Article 16 deferral powers to stay an active investigation or prosecution. In the cases of both Sudan and Libya, the Council's decision to act in the face of evidence of significant and widespread human rights violations was, particularly in the West, largely applauded by those who have actively supported the development of human rights and international criminal tribunals. Both cases demonstrate the primary benefit of Council referrals, which is that they expand the reach of accountability to cases where the ICC would normally not have access--cases where the suspects are either not nationals of a country that has ratified the Rome Statute, or where the crimes under scrutiny were not committed on the territory of a ratifying party. Yet for all the good that Security Council referrals do in expanding accountability and combating impunity, there is a danger they could, and already do, undermine the wider aims of international criminal justice. Such referrals not only could erode the legal principles at the heart of this project, not least the fundamental tenets of the rule of law, but also on a more practical level could provoke a backlash against the ICC over the perceived use of international justice as a bargaining chip or tool to gain political powers. …

This contribution explores the implications of United Nations Security Council (UNSC) referrals under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations to the International Criminal Court (ICC) for the immunity ratione personae of officials of states that are not party to the ICC Statute. While Article 13(b) of the ICC Statute allows the ICC to receive referrals of situations by the UNSC, disagreement remains among authors as to when such a referral removes the customary immunity attached to a head of state of a nonstate party to the ICC Statute. In particular, it remains disputed whether the broad obligation placed on Sudan by UNSC Resolution 1593 (2005) had the implicit effect of doing so. In referring the situation in Darfur (Sudan) to the ICC under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the UNSC determined that “the government of Sudan, and all other parties to the conflict in Darfur, shall cooperate fully with and provide any necessary assistance to the Court and the prosecutor pursuant to this resolution.”

In 1998, the international community decided to establish the first permanent International Criminal Court (ICC) with jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international concern, as referred to in the Rome Statute. As noted by many observers, some of the specific crimes within the Rome Statute are not grounded on customary international law but are more germane to treaty-based crimes. Thus, the exercise of treaty-based jurisdiction over non-party States would conflict with the principle pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt. While the ICC jurisdiction is limited to crimes committed in the territory or by nationals of its States Parties, the Court may, where a situation is referred by the UN Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, exercise jurisdiction over crimes committed in the territory and by nationals of States not party to the Statute. Since the Rome Statute may go beyond existing applicable law, the referrals to the ICC are thus normative in their character. They impose new rules to be observed by any actors in the situations referred. This paper argues that this feature of a Security Council referral fits the definition of an international legislative act. The paper also inquires whether the obligation to cooperate fully with the Court arising from the Security Council resolution and the principle of complementarity require the State to modify its domestic law.

Representational Practices at the International Criminal Court: The Gap between Juridified and Abstract Victimhood

The legality principle is enshrined in the Rome Statute, but the International Criminal Court (ICC) can nevertheless exercise jurisdiction over conduct by nationals of non-party States, that occur on the territory of a State that has not ratified the Rome Statute. When the UN Security Council refers a situation in such a State to the ICC, thereby granting it ad hoc jurisdiction over that specific situation, the ICC basically acts as an “ad hoc tribunal”, based on Chapter VII of the UN Charter. It acts, then, in much the same way as the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda were, and are still, acting. Namely, as a judicial body specifically instituted for one situation. In this contribution it is submitted that the ICC, when prosecuting (war) crimes that allegedly occurred on the territory of non-party States, and were allegedly committed by nationals of non-party States, will have to consider whether the said acts are actually punishable by the Court. The crime of attacking peacekeepers, as charged in the Banda case, is looked at as a case study. It is argued that the ICC should, in a similar fashion as the ICTY has done, apply the so-called “Tadic conditions”, or create an ICC version thereof, to establish its jurisdiction – and thereby enhance its legitimacy.

The establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC) is an extraordinary phenomenon, and perhaps the most important institutional innovation since the founding of the United Nations (UN). The Court has opened up new hopes, raised new challenges and heralded new dispensation in the administration of international criminal justice. To date, the Court has been seized of only seven situations all of which originate from Africa. Five of the seven situations were voluntarily referred to the ICC by African states themselves. The remaining two (Sudan and Libya) are UN Security Council referrals. There is no doubt that Security Council referral is at the heart of the ICC trigger mechanisms. It ensures respect for the ICC and prevents unnecessary proliferation of ad hoc tribunals. The greatest advantage of the Security Council referral is its imperativeness and binding effect on the ICC's states parties and non-states parties alike. This article examines the prospects and challenges of the Security Council referral mechanism within the ICC framework. The article argues that while the Security Council referral mechanism offers so much hope and opportunity in the global fight against impunity, its abuse portends grave danger to the very existence of the ICC.

Shall I Surrender Thee to the International Criminal Court‘: The United States and Bilateral 'Non-Surrender' Agreements

The African Union (AU) has declared a 'war' on International Criminal Court (ICC), permanent institution established to prosecute and punish persons for the most serious crimes of international concern. This chapter interrogates politics of international criminal justice as it is being played out by face-off between AU and ICC. It analyzes following questions: Is ICC an obstacle to a peaceful resolution of conflicts in some African states? Is justice adverse to peace or can both coexist within same normative and institutional framework? The chapter also examines source of AU's authority, if any, to instruct African states regarding their obligations under ICC Statute. It concludes with a reflection on broader theme and urges AU to work with global community, including ICC and UN Security Council, to resolve current differences. Keywords: African Union; African Union (AU); International Criminal Court; International Criminal Court (ICC); International Criminal Justice; UN Security Council

This paper thoroughly examines the crime of aggression in the form of the blockade of the Gaza Strip imposed by Israel and the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC) over this matter, despite Israel not being a state party to the Rome Statute. The research conducted is based on normative judicial research, utilizing primary and secondary legal resources. The findings of this research highlight the significant impact of the blockade on the Gaza Strip and Israel's violation of Article 8 bis of the Rome Statute, which specifically pertains to the crime of aggression. Israel's actions can be unequivocally categorized as a crime of aggression, as they fulfill the elements outlined in the article defining this crime. It is important to note that the ICC retains jurisdiction over the crime of aggression, even in cases involving non-member states like Israel, through UN Security Council referrals. In light of this, it is imperative for the ICC to take proactive action and prosecute Israel for this crime, serving as the last resort for global justice seekers.

"The Audacity of Compromise: The UN Security Council and the Pre-conditions to the Exercise of Jurisdiction by the ICC with Regard to the Crime of Aggression" published on 01 Jan 2009 by Brill | Nijhoff.

The UN Security Council plays a prominent role in the functioning of the International Criminal Court (ICC). Although the ICC is a judicial institution distinct from the UN system, the Security Council, through provisions in the ICC’s governing treaty (the Rome Statute), can refer situations to the ICC Prosecutor for investigations or prosecutions. This power, contained in Article 13(b) of the Statute, enables the Council to transcend the nationality and territoriality pre-conditions necessary to trigger the Court’s jurisdiction. Through Article 16 the Security Council can prevent the initiation or continuation of investigations or prosecutions for a renewable period of 12 months following the adoption of a resolution under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. In exercising its referral and deferral powers, the Security Council must act under Chapter VII of the Charter, specifically Article 41, which provides that the Council may decide what measures not involving the use of force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions. Between June 2002 and April 2014, the Security Council expressly invoked its deferral powers on three occasions and referred two situations to the Prosecutor: Darfur (2005) and Libya (2011). In this paper I will consider the arguments that this relationship between the ICC and the Security Council has become politicized. I will review the drafting history of the Rome Statute to assess how this relationship was originally envisioned and whether the political undertones of such a relationship were apparent. I then will consider how the Council has applied its powers. Finally I will propose recommendations to redefine the relationship to improve the Court’s effectiveness, with particular emphasis on the Prosecutor’s discretionary powers under Article 53 of the Rome Statute. Ideally a relationship between the ICC and the UN Security Council would serve multiple interests. In drafting the Rome Statute, the International Law Commission (ILC) considered that since the UN Charter confers upon the Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, referral powers would provide the Council with a standby permanent tribunal through which it could adopt international criminal justice as a means

On February 26 2011, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1970 referring the situation concerning Libya to the International Criminal Court (ICC). Th is unprecedented support for and acknowledgment of the ICC did not come without a price: conditio sine qua non for Council members not party to the ICC was the inclusion of operative § 6 into the resolution, which exempts certain categories of nationals of non-parties from ICC jurisdiction. Th e same highly controversial exemption was included in the Security Council’s referral of the situation in Darfur to the ICC in 2005. Deviating from the Rome Statute’s jurisdiction regime such practice not just poses challenges to principles of international criminal justice but raises the question whether the Rome Statute is altered by the resolution containing the referral to the effect that the ICC is being bound to the exemptions contained in its exercise of jurisdiction. Addressing these issues, the present paper elaborates firstly on the jurisdictional exemption of § 6 and its effect on the ICC, followed by a discussion of resulting challenges to the principle of legality, the principle of universal jurisdiction for international crimes, the equality of individuals before the law and the principle of independence of the court.

The International Criminal Court (the ICC) is an independent institution and the world's first international permanent criminal court. The ICC was created via a multi-lateral treaty; the Rome Statute adopted by the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court 17 July, 1998 in Rome (see Appendix F.1 for the text of the Rome Statute). This is unlike the situation with the other international criminal courts so far discussed; the ICTR, ICTY and SCSL. The latter courts have a mandate which ends after a defined period of time. The ICTR, ICTY and SCSL were set up by the United Nations Security Council in response to the need to respond to specific situations that occurred in these jurisdictions and avoid the perpetrators of international crimes involved in those particular situations escaping justice. The Assembly of States (comprised of the State Parties to the Rome Statute) is the body that has oversight over the ICC and is responsible for any legislative decisions affecting the legal instruments guiding the operation of ICC. The States Parties to the Rome Statute have a legal obligation under that treaty to cooperate with the International Criminal Court. As of 14 November, 2008, there were 108 States Parties (States which had ratified the Rome Statute), but these did not include a number of major powers such as the United States, Russia, and China. There is also an agreement between the United Nations and the ICC which sets out institutional co-operative relations that allows, for instance, for exchange of information, etc. (i.e., the United Nations may have confidential documents relevant to a case being prosecuted by the ICC which it will share with the ICC subject to certain confidentiality provisions. This in order that the Prosecutor may use the information provided by the United Nations to develop further evidence). However, the ICC is not part of the United Nations but rather a completely independent institution. The ICC makes an annual report to the United Nations on its activities. However, the ICC remains a fully independent institution.

This study aims at discussingwhat factors behind the Gambian policy to leave the International Criminal Court. Moreover, it will explain what forms of discrimination carried out by the International Criminal Court as well as Yahya Jammeh's policies that have become controversial and criticized by the Gambia people and the international community.Gambia withdrawalfrom the International Criminal Court in Yahya Jammeh's Era. The International Criminal Court is a permanent international court established to investigate, prosecute and try individuals accused of committing the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole, namely the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression.To date, almost all of its full-fledged investigations have focused on Africa . Gambia demanded the International Criminal Court to prosecute the European Union for the death of African migrants on the European Coast and sued former British Prime Minister Tony Blair for his suspicion in the Iraq War. In addition, the double standards imposed by the International Criminal Court against the UN Security Council led to criticism from African countries, especially the Gambia. The case of Sudan (Darfur) and Libya are referred to by the UN Security Council while 3 of the 5 veto holders are not members of the International Criminal Court. On the other hand, the Yahya Jammeh Government has come under fire from the international and national Gambia for the violence committed against the people, especially against the opposition members, human right defenders, journalists and the LGBT communties. The European Union, the United Nations, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, demand the International Criminal Court to investigate Yahya Jammeh's Government.