Abstract

From a comparative perspective, the Austrian Federal Constitution appears rather centralized, given that the majority of legislative competences are allocated at the federal level. However, a closer look indicates that the Lander (the federal units) gain considerable political weight by serving as the administrative centre of gravity; namely, the Lander execute their own laws and most of the laws based on the federation’s subject-matters. Hence, one might speak of “administrative federalism”. History shows that Austrian politics resemble a tug-of-war over the federal division of (legislative) competences. The newly elected coalition government’s program joins the ranks of long-winded discussions on how to make Austrian federalism more efficient. Even if pro-federal by rhetoric, the actual content of the government program is either conceptually ambivalent or substantially in favour of increased (legislative) centralization, especially in the realm of social and educational policy.

Full Text
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