Abstract

The dominant narrative is that public financing and investment in the public sector depend on the political leadership of the government executive because of the incentives gained in public finance management. The executive arm of the government includes elected political leaders and technocrats. Using the case of the agricultural sector, this paper examines the role of technocrats and elected leadership in investment choices. This paper uses, in support of quantitative findings, qualitative evidence from a case study designed in the Department of Animal Health and Livestock Development in Malawi. The variables were used to analyze the quantitative data, and content analysis was used for qualitative data. The finding reveals that seniority, authority, political affiliation, and technical expertise of civil servant leadership significantly influence public investment choices in the livestock sector in Malawi. Both elected political executives and technocrats had self-interests in delivering goods with swift and visible returns. The study concludes that Malawi's public sector investment arena is a ‘war zone’ with various actors vying for dominance. The paper recommends a critical review of the reforms in the livestock sector to bring the investment culture on course in Malawi. More studies are needed to resolve issues around privatization models of services in the livestock sector and the role of government and transactional actors.

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