Abstract
The security of cryptocircuits is determined not only for their mathematical formulation, but for their physical implementation. The so-called fault injection attacks, where an attacker inserts faults during the operation of the cipher to obtain a malfunction to reveal secret information, pose a serious threat for security. These attacks are also used by designers as a vehicle to detect security flaws and then protect the circuits against these kinds of attacks. In this paper, two different attack methodologies are presented based on inserting faults through the clock signal or the control signal. The optimization of the attacks is evaluated under supply voltage and temperature variation, experimentally determining the feasibility through the evaluation of different Trivium versions in 90 nm ASIC technology implementations, also considering different routing alternatives. The results show that it is possible to inject effective faults with both methodologies, improving fault efficiency if the power supply voltage decreases, which requires only half the frequency of the short pulse inserted into the clock signal to obtain a fault. The clock signal modification methodology can be extended to other NLFSR-based cryptocircuits and the control signal-based methodology can be applied to both block and stream ciphers.
Highlights
The tables show the data of the attack results related to five specific clock cycles where the attacks were carried out, specifying if faults were injected into each pair of Trivium ciphers
Different methodologies for testing the vulnerabilities of different versions of the Trivium stream cipher implemented in application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC) against fault attacks are presented
In the case of the short pulse introduction combined with the variation of the circuit temperature, in a range that did not produce damages in the circuit, it was observed that it had no effect on the possibility of injecting a greater or lower number of faults, which showed the same results for all temperatures
Summary
There are new analysis techniques that do not attack the mathematical implementation of the algorithm itself, but the physical implementation of it. These analysis techniques are known as passive and active attacks [1–7]. Passive attacks are the so-called side channel attacks, which exploit physical leakages during encryption processes, such as power consumption, electromagnetic radiation, or timing, to reveal secret information, e.g., power analysis (PA) [1,2]. We focus on active non-invasive attacks that, together with the fault analysis (FA) [3–7], are able to compromise the security of cryptosystems without causing any damage to the circuit or evidence of manipulation
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