Existentialism and Ecstasy: Colin Wilson’s Phenomenological Account of Peak Experiences

Biagio G Tassone

doi:10.22329/p.v13i1.4909

Abstract

This paper critically examines the philosophical foundations of Colin Wilson’s New Existentialism. I will show how Wilson’s writings promoted a phenomenological strategy for understanding states of ecstatic affirmation within so-called ‘peak experiences’. Wilson subsequently attempted to use the life affirming insights bestowed by peak states to establish an ontological ground for values to serve as a foundation for his New Existentialism. Because of its psychological focus however, I argue that Wilson’s New Existentialism contains an ambivalent framework for establishing ontological categories, which leads his thought into theoretical difficulties. More precisely, Wilson’s strategy runs into problems in coherently integrating its explicitly psychological interpretation of Husserl’s theory of intentionality within a broader, and philosophically coherent, phenomenological framework. Wilson’s psychological reading of Husserl’s transcendental reduction, for example, manifests tensions in how it reconciles the empirical basis of acts of transcendence with an essentialist conception of the self as a transcendental ego. The above tensions, I argue, ultimately render the New Existentialism susceptible to criticism from a Husserlian-transcendental perspective. After outlining a Husserlian critique of Wilson’s position, I end the paper by suggesting how some of the central insights of the New Existentialism might help to bridge the gap that persists between pure phenomenological description and metaphysics.

Highlights

For over half a century the writings of Colin Wilson (1931-2013) explored existentialist themes and engaged with important problems arising from the connection between truth, 47 Biagio Gerard Tassone meaning and existence.[1]
Wilson’s position manifests various tensions resulting mainly from his attempts to apply Husserlian phenomenology to the analysis of consciousness in tandem with promoting an implicit revision of the broadly transcendental framework used by Husserl
If Wilson’s New Existentialism is compatible with what can be called Husserlian phenomenological psychology, his works require clarification on an ontological level, as well as critical scrutiny with a focus placed on answering the question of how intentional categories relate to broader, ontological, ones

Summary

Introduction

For over half a century the writings of Colin Wilson (1931-2013) explored existentialist themes and engaged with important problems arising from the connection between truth, 47 Biagio Gerard Tassone meaning and existence.[1]. In focusing on experience and existentialist themes, while consistently stressing the importance of what the German philosopher Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) called the ‘theoretical attitude’, Wilson’s work set out to undertake phenomenological analyses of intentional mental states.[3] The ensuing studies of consciousness, subsequently, are wedded to a broadly metaphysical project In this way Wilson critically reassesses the legacy of twentieth century existentialism and in the process develops his own theories for understanding human motivation and purpose. The implication of this deeper understanding of meaning apprehension in relation to a larger, and far more complex, reality is soon demonstrated to be a valid response to the basically existential problem of life-failure Wilson explains this by focusing on a phenomenological clarification of Maslow’s peak experiences. Distinguishing this philosophical approach as a novel and positive form of existentialism, yet without advocating traditional religious answers to basically “religious problems,” Wilson proceeded to develop various methods for justifying his metaphysics of value.[12]

The Primacy of the Peak Experience

Wilson’s Phenomenology of the Peak Experience: A Critical Husserlian Response

Conclusion