Abstract
We turn now to Husserl’s theory of intentionality. We see this theory as differing fundamentally from theories that take what we have called the “object-approach” to intentionality. To articulate this difference in a clear and convincing way is one of our most important tasks. Our interpretation of Husserl’s theory of intentionality, our understanding of Husserl’s phenomenology in general, and our own treatment of some of the problems of intentionality in later chapters are all predicated on a proper appreciation of this difference.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callSimilar Papers
Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
