Abstract
In this Letter, we investigate stochastic stability in a two-phenotype evolutionary game model for an infinite, well-mixed population undergoing discrete, nonoverlapping generations. We assume that the fitness of a phenotype is an exponential function of its expected payoff following random pairwise interactions whose outcomes randomly fluctuate with time. We show that the stochastic local stability of a constant interior equilibrium can be promoted by the random environmental noise even if the system may display a complicated nonlinear dynamics. This result provides a new perspective for a better understanding of how environmental fluctuations may contribute to the evolution of behavioral diversity.
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