Abstract

To show the impact of environmental noise on imitation dynamics, the stochastic stability and stochastic evolutionary stability of a discrete-time imitation dynamics with random payoffs are studied in this paper. Based on the stochastic local stability of fixation states and constant interior equilibria in a two-phenotype model, we extend the concept of stochastic evolutionary stability to the stochastic imitation dynamics, which is defined as a strategy such that, if all the members of the population adopt it, then the probability for any mutant strategy to invade the population successfully under the influence of natural selection is arbitrarily low. Our main results show clearly that the stochastic evolutionary stability of the system depends only on the properties of the mean matrix of the random payoff matrix and is independent of the randomness of the random payoff matrix. Moreover, as two examples, we show also that under the framework of stochastic imitation dynamics, the noise intensity affects the evolution of cooperative behavior in a stochastic prisoner's dilemma game and the system's nonlinear dynamic behavior.

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