Doors of perception: national security politics, threat perceptions, and North Korea's pursuit of a credible deterrent

Abstract

Abstract Analysts of international relations often assume a “billiard-ball model” of state behavior. This paper argues that, in analyzing the dynamic in which the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) has opted to pursue nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs, analysts must take a more complex approach. Such an approach must consider the nuances of each state actor and these nuances’ contribution to the perception of threat a state projects. Specifically, this paper follows the development of the national missile defense debate in the United States Congress and, upon this, projects the development of the North Korean ballistic missile and nuclear weapons programs. This paper shows how the necessity to oversell or inflate a threat due to the nature of American political institutions has inadvertently escalated the perceived threat held by the DPRK. Therefore, the domestic politics and the political landscape of the United States have undermined the cohesion of its national security policy.